PLEASE NOTE:
*
CCNet CLIMATE SCARES & CLIMATE CHANGE - 4 January 2002
------------------------------------------------------
"If there was no dramatic break-up
of the Antarctic Ice Sheet "over
the last few glacial cycles," as
the authors say, there's a good
chance there will also be none before
the current interglacial ends.
And since the data of Petit et al.
(1999) indicate that each of the
last four intergalcials were warmer than
the current one - and by an
average of more than 2°C - there's an
extremely good chance there
will be no such break-up this time
around."
--CO2
Science Magazine, 2 January 2002
"The bottom line of all these
studies thus seems to be that we
really do not know if there are any
long-term positive or negative
mass balance changes occurring on either
the Greenland or Antarctic
ice sheets. Hence, it is important that
we continue to collect data
in these two polar regions, so that
someday we will be able to
unambiguously discern whatever trends or
non-trends are
representative of reality. In the mean
time, don't buy into anything
about these ice sheets that sounds
either too good or too bad to be
true. It likely isn't."
--CO2
Science Magazine, 2 January 2002
(1) WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE ANTARCTIC ICE SHEET COLLAPSING
SOON?
CO2 Science Magazine, 2 January 2002
(2) WEST ANTARCTIC ICE SHEET
Michael Paine <mpaine@tpgi.com.au>
(3) IS IT TRUE WHAT THEY SAY ABOUT THE GREENLAND ICE SHEETS?
CO2 Science Magazine, 2 January 2002
(4) GLOBAL WARMING: NEGLECTING THE COMPLEXITIES
Michael Paine <mpaine@tpgi.com.au>
(5) GLOBAL WARMING AND CHEAP FOSSIL FULES: THEY'RE GOOD FOR YOU!
CO2 Science Magazine, 2 January 202
(6) PHILOSOPHY 101: GLOBAL WARMING MYTHS VS. EMPIRICISM
Tech Central Station, 13 December 2001
(7) WEIGHING THE WORDS: GETTING THE BIAS OUT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMUNICATIONS
The Reason Public Policy Institite, October
2001
(8) FACING ECONOMIC CRISIS, JAPAN CASTS ASIDE KYOTO AGREEMENT
CNN, 30 December 2001
(9) SCIENCE, ECONOMICS SLAY KYOTO DRAGON: JAPAN JOINS U.S.
Tech Central Station, 2 January 2001
===========
(1) WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE ANTARCTIC ICE SHEET COLLAPSING
SOON?
>From CO2 Science Magazine, 2 January 2002
http://www.co2science.org/journal/2002/v5n1c2.htm.
Reference
Cofaigh, C.O., Dowdeswell, J.A. and Pudsey, C.J.
2001. Late Quaternary
iceberg rafting along the Antarctic Peninsula continental rise in
the
Weddell and Scotia Seas. Quaternary Research 56: 308-321.
What was done
Five sediment cores from the continental rise west of the
Antarctic
Peninsula and six from the Weddell and Scotia Seas were
investigated for
their ice rafted debris (IRD) content in an attempt to determine
if
there are Antarctic analogues of the Heinrich layers of the North
Atlantic Ocean, which testify of the repeated collapse of the
eastern
margin of the Laurentide Ice Sheet and the concomitant massive
discharge
of icebergs. If such IRD layers exist around Antarctica,
the authors
reasoned, they would be evidence of "periodic, widespread
catastrophic
collapse of basins within the Antarctic Ice Sheet," which
could
obviously occur again.
What was learned
After carefully analyzing their data, the authors concluded that
"the
ice sheet over the Antarctic Peninsula did not undergo widespread
catastrophic collapse along its western margin during the late
Quaternary." They also say their evidence "argues
against pervasive,
rapid ice-sheet collapse around the Weddell embayment over the
last few
glacial cycles."
What it means
If there was no dramatic break-up of the Antarctic Ice Sheet
"over the
last few glacial cycles," as the authors say, there's a good
chance
there will also be none before the current interglacial
ends. And since
the data of Petit et al. (1999) indicate that each of the last
four
intergalcials were warmer than the current one - and by an
average of
more than 2°C - there's an extremely good chance there will be
no such
break-up this time around.
Reference
Petit, J.R., Jouzel, J., Raynaud, D., Barkov, N.I., Barnola,
J.-M.,
Basile, I., Bender, M., Chappellaz, J., Davis, M., Delaygue, G.,
Delmotte, M., Kotlyakov, V.M., Legrand, M., Lipenkov, V.Y.,
Lorius, C.,
Pepin, L., Ritz, C., Saltzman, E., and Stievenard, M.
1999. Climate
and atmospheric history of the past 420,000 years from the Vostok
ice
core, Antarctica. Nature 399: 429-436.
Copyright © 2002. Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide
and Global
Change
============
(2) WEST ANTARCTIC ICE SHEET
>From Michael Paine <mpaine@tpgi.com.au>
Dear Benny (NEO and Climate Change relevance)
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_1731000/1731163.stm
Low probability of ice collapse - a one in twenty chance of the
West
Antarctic Ice Sheet collapsing in the next 200 years, resulting
in sea
levels rising by several metres. Excuse me, but for such a high
consequence event, this does not seem to be a "low
probability".
regards and best wishes for 2002
Michael Paine
=============
(3) IS IT TRUE WHAT THEY SAY ABOUT THE GREENLAND ICE SHEETS?
>From CO2 Science Magazine, 2 January 2002
http://www.co2science.org/subject/i/summaries/icesheetgreen.htm.
Studies of the growth and decay of polar ice sheets are of great
importance because of the impacts these phenomena have on sea
level. In
this summary we thus review a number of such studies that pertain
to the
Greenland Ice Sheet.
Davis et al. (1998) used Seasat and Geosat radar altimeter data
to
assess changes in the elevation of the Greenland ice sheet
between 1978
and 1988, finding a modest overall thickening. McConnell et
al. (2000)
derived elevation changes for this same time period from a model
of firn
densification and records of annual snow accumulation derived
from
twelve ice cores obtained at high elevations. Their results
agreed well
with those of Davis et al. and allowed them to further conclude
that
"the decadal-scale changes in ice-sheet elevation that
occurred during
1978-88 are typical over the last few centuries and well within
the
natural variability of accumulation-driven elevation
change," suggesting
little to no long-term change in the overall mass balance of the
ice
sheet.
Thomas et al. (2000) compared estimates of ice discharge from
higher
elevations of the Greenland ice sheet (derived from ice motions
inferred
from Global Positioning System measurements made between 1993 and
1997)
with total snow accumulation estimates to calculate ice
thickening rates
over the past few decades. They too concluded that
"the higher
elevation parts of the ice sheet have been almost exactly in
balance
when considered as a whole."
Aircraft laser-altimeter measurements made over southern
Greenland in
1993 and 1998 served as the basis for the study of Krabill et al.
(1999), who observed a small net thickening of the ice sheet for
elevations above 2000 meters, where they considered their data
"most
reliable." Lower elevations, however, were reported to
be thinning; but
they said it was "extremely unlikely" the thinning was
due to "an
increase in summer melting." Overall, the portion of
the ice sheet
south of 72° N latitude was determined to be "in negative
balance."
The following year, Krabill et al. (2000) used aircraft
laser-altimeter
data obtained over northern Greenland in 1994 and 1999, together
with
their previous data from southern Greenland, to evaluate the mass
balance of the entire ice sheet. At elevations above 2000
meters, they
found a small net thickening; but after accounting for bedrock
uplift,
the balance was determined to be essentially
"zero." Thinning again
predominated along about 70% of the coast; but these results were
obtained from estimates of interpolations based on calculations
of a
hypothetical thinning rate. Perhaps this far removal of
their final
low-elevation result from any primary data is why the authors say
they
could find no satisfactory explanation for it, i.e., the thinning
may
not have been real. Even if it were, however, the thinning
of the
coastal portions of the ice sheet is unlikely to have been caused
by
global or regional warming; for the authors report that
"Greenland
temperature records from 1900-95 show highest summer temperatures
in the
1930s" and that "the 1980s and early 1990s were about
half a degree
cooler than the 96-year mean."
Although the Krabill et al. (2000) study was thus rife with many
uncertainties, the media sunk their teeth into it with great
relish [see
our Editorial of 26 July 2000: Media Mania Over Purported
Greenland
Meltdown: Fueled by Fear of Frying]. As one news story put
it, "a
warming climate is melting more than 50 billion tons of water a
year
from the Greenland ice sheet, adding to a 9-inch global rise in
sea
level over the last century and increasing the risk of coastal
flooding
around the world." If its author had done a few simple
calculations,
however, he or she would have found that to raise global sea
level as
much as all other natural processes raised it over the last
century, the
purported thinning of the ice sheet along Greenland's coast
(which
equates to a sea level rise of 0.005 inch per year) would have to
continue for nigh unto two millennia. And as the senior
author of the
study stated explicitly in a NASA press release, "this
amount of sea
level rise does not threaten coastal regions."
If the studies reviewed above teach us anything, it is that we
have a
great need for high-quality, long-term, ice-sheet mass balance
data; and
in a study of the mass balances of all of earth's glaciers for
which
such data exist, Braithwaite and Zhang (2000) present even more
evidence
of this need. Extrapolating what they learned from smaller
glaciers to
the Greenland ice sheet, for example, they conclude that
"the ice sheet
can thicken or thin by several meters over 20-30 years without
giving
statistically significant evidence of non-zero balance under
present
climate." Hence, they say the Greenland ice sheet
might "have to be
monitored over many decades to detect unambiguous evidence of
either
thinning, due to increased melting, or thickening, due to
increased
accumulation."
Reeh (1999) reached much the same conclusion, stating "we do
not know" -
with respect to the ice covers of both Greenland and Antarctica -
"whether the ice sheets are currently in balance; neither do
we know if
their volume or mass has increased or decreased during the last
100
years." Climate model predictions are of little help
either. Working
with the two most recent incarnations of the GCM developed by the
Max
Plank Institute for Meteorology in Hamburg, Germany, for example,
Wild
and Ohmura (2000) concluded that the sea level change resulting
from the
combined changes in the ice sheets of both Greenland and
Antarctica at
the time of a doubled atmospheric CO2 concentration would be
either
"close to zero" or indicative of a sea level fall rate
of 0.6 mm per
year.
>From a recalibration of oxygen isotope-derived temperatures
based on
data obtained from central Greenland ice cores, however, Cuffey
and
Marshall (2000) have tentatively determined that the Greenland
ice sheet
may have been much smaller during the last interglacial than
previously
thought. If such is true, it implies the potential for
further major
shrinkage of the Greenland ice sheet ... but only if the planet
were to
warm substantially more than it did during the past century,
i.e., by a
several-fold factor [see our Journal Review of Petit et al.
(1999)].
Furthermore, this conclusion implies, in Cuffey and Marshall's
words,
that "high sea levels during the last interglacial should
not be
interpreted as evidence for extensive melting of the West
Antarctic Ice
Sheet, and so challenges the hypothesis that the West Antarctic
is
particularly sensitive to climate change." Therefore,
since the
Antarctic is by far the most important repository of potential
melt-water on the planet, this slight unease about the potential
for
additional shrinkage of the Greenland ice sheet is more than
compensated
by the greater confidence it gives us that we do not have to
worry about
the analogous phenomenon occurring in Antarctica.
The bottom line of all these studies thus seems to be that we
really do
not know if there are any long-term positive or negative mass
balance
changes occurring on either the Greenland or Antarctic ice
sheets.
Hence, it is important that we continue to collect data in these
two
polar regions, so that someday we will be able to unambiguously
discern
whatever trends or non-trends are representative of reality.
In the mean time, don't buy into anything about these ice sheets
that
sounds either too good or too bad to be true. It likely isn't.
Reference
Braithwaite, R.J. and Zhang, Y. 2000. Relationships
between
interannual variability of glacier mass balance and
climate. Journal of
Glaciology 45: 456-462.
Cuffey, K.M. and Marshall, S.J. 2000. Substantial
contribution to
sea-level rise during the last interglacial from the Greenland
ice
sheet. Nature 404: 591-594.
Davis, C.H., Kluever, C.A. and Haines, B.J. 1998.
Elevation change of
the southern Greenland ice sheet. Science 279: 2086-2088.
Krabill, W., Frederick, E., Manizade, S., Martin, C., Sonntag,
J.,
Swift, R., Thomas, R., Wright, W. and Yungel, J.
1999. Rapid thinning
of parts of the southern Greenland ice sheet. Science 283:
1522-1524.
Krabill, W., Abdalati, W., Frederick, E., Manizade, S., Martin,
C.,
Sonntag, J., Swift, R., Thomas, R., Wright, W. and Yungel,
J. 2000.
Greenland ice sheet: High-elevation balance and peripheral
thinning.
Science 289: 428-430.
McConnell, J.R., Arthern, R.J., Mosley-Thompson, E., Davis, C.H.,
Bales,
R.C., Thomas, R., Burkhart, J.F. and Kyne, J.D. 2000.
Changes in
Greenland ice sheet elevation attributed primarily to snow
accumulation
variability. Nature 406: 877-879.
Petit, J.R., Jouzel, J., Raynaud, D., Barkov, N.I., Barnola,
J.-M.,
Basile, I., Bender, M., Chappellaz, J., Davis, M., Delaygue, G.,
Delmotte, M., Kotlyakov, V.M., Legrand, M., Lipenkov, V.Y.,
Lorius, C.,
Pepin, L., Ritz, C., Saltzman, E., and Stievenard, M.
1999. Climate
and atmospheric history of the past 420,000 years from the Vostok
ice
core, Antarctica. Nature 399: 429-436.
Reeh, N. 1999. Mass balance of the Greenland ice
sheet: Can modern
observation methods reduce the uncertainty? Geografiska
Annaler 81A:
735-742.
Thomas, R., Akins, T., Csatho, B., Fahnestock, M., Gogineni, P.,
Kim, C.
and Sonntag, J. 2000. Mass balance of the Greenland
ice sheet at high
elevations. Science 289: 426-428.
Wild, M. and Ohmura, A. 2000. Change in mass balance
of polar ice
sheets and sea level from high-resolution GCM simulations of
greenhouse
warming. Annals of Glaciology 30: 197-203.
Copyright © 2002. Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide
and Global
Change
==============
(4) GLOBAL WARMING: NEGLECTING THE COMPLEXITIES
>From Michael Paine <mpaine@tpgi.com.au>
Dear Benny
Here is an article from the latest Scientific American that
criticises
the climate change chapter of the book 'The Skeptical
Environmentalist'
by Bjorn Lomborg.
regards
Michael Paine
GLOBAL WARMING: NEGLECTING THE COMPLEXITIES
by Stephen Schneider
Scientific American, January 2002
For three decades, I have been debating alternative solutions for
sustainable development with thousands of fellow scientists and
policy
analysts-exchanges carried out in myriad articles and formal
meetings.
Despite all that, I readily confess a lingering frustration:
uncertainties so infuse the issue of climate change that it is
still
impossible to rule out either mild or catastrophic outcomes, let
alone
provide confident probabilities for all the claims and
counterclaims
made about environmental problems.
Even the most credible international assessment body, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has refused to
attempt
subjective probabilistic estimates of future temperatures. This
has
forced politicians to make their own guesses about the likelihood
of
various degrees of global warming. Will temperatures in 2100
increase by
1.4 degrees Celsius or by 5.8? The difference means relatively
adaptable
changes or very damaging ones.
Against this background of frustration, I began increasingly to
hear
that a young Danish statistician in a political science
department,
Bjorn Lomborg, had applied his skills in statistics to better
determine
how serious environmental problems are. Of course, I was anxious
to see
this highly publicized contribution -- The Skeptical
Environmentalist:
Measuring the Real State of the World. A "skeptical
environmentalist" is
certainly the best kind, I mused, because uncertainties are so
endemic
in these complex problems that suffer from missing data,
incomplete
theory and nonlinear interactions. But the "real state of
the
world"-that is a high bar to set, given the large range of
plausible
outcomes.
And who is Lomborg, I wondered, and why haven't I come across him
at any
of the meetings where the usual suspects debate costs, benefits,
extinction rates, carrying capacity or cloud feedback? I couldn't
recall
reading any scientific or policy contributions from him either.
But
there was this massive 515page tome with a whopping 2,930
endnotes to
wade through. On page xx of his preface, Lomborg admits, "I
am not
myself an expert as regards environmental problems"-truer
words are not
found in the rest of the book, as I'II soon illustrate. I will
report
primarily on the thick global warming chapter and its 600-plus
endnotes.
That kind of deadweight of detail alone conjures at least the
trappings
of comprehensive and careful scholarship. So how does the reality
of the
text hold up to the pretense? I'm sure you can already guess, but
let me
give some examples to make clear what I learned by reading.
The climate chapter makes four basic arguments:
Climate Science is very uncertain but nonetheless the real state
of the
science is that the sensitivity of the climate to carbon dioxide
will
turn out to be at the low end of the IPCC uncertainty range-which
is for
a warming of 1.5 to 4.5 degrees C if carbon dioxide were to
double and
be held fixed over time.
Emissions scenarios, according to the IPCC, fall into six
"equally
sound" alternative paths. These paths span a doubling in
carbon dioxide
concentrations ill 2100 up to more than tripling and well beyond
tripling in the 22nd century. Lomborg, however, dismisses all but
the
lowest of the scenarios: "Temperatures will increase much
less than the
maximum estimates from IPCC-it is likely that the temperature
will be at
or below the B1 estimate [the lowest emissions scenario] (less
than 2ø C
in 2100) and the temperature will certainly pot increase even
further
into the twenty-second century."
Cost-benefit calculations show that although the benefits of
avoiding
climate change could be substantial ($5 trillion is the single
figure
Lomborg cites), this is not worth the cost to the economy of
trying to
constrain fossilfuel emissions (a $3-trillion to $33-trillion
range he
pulls from the economics literature). Asymmetrically, no range is
given
for the climate damages.
The Kyoto Protocol, which caps industrialized countries' output
of
greenhouse gases, is too expensive. It would reduce warming in
2100 by
only a few tenths of a degree-"putting off the temperature
increase just
six years." This number, though, is based on a strawman
policy that
nobody has seriously proposed: Lomborg extrapolates the Kyoto
Protocol,
which is applicable only up to 2012, as the world's sole climate
policy
for another nine decades.
Before providing specifices of why I believe each of these
assertions is
fatally flawed, I should say something about Lomborg's methods.
First,
most of his nearly 3,000 citations are to secondary literature
and media
articles. Moreover, even when cited, the peer-reviewed articles
come
elliptically from those studies that support his rosy view that
only the
low end of the uncertainty ranges will be plausible. IPCC
authors, in
contrast, were subjected to three rounds of review by hundreds of
outside experts. They didn't have the luxury of reporting
primarily from
the part of the community that agrees with their individual
views.
Second, it is ironic that in a popular book by a statistician one
can't
find a clear discussion of the distinction among different types
of
probabilities, such as frequentist and Bayesian (that is,
"objective"
and "subjective"). He uses the word
"plausible" often, but, curiously
for a statistician, he never attaches any probability to what is
"plausible." The Third Assessment Report of the IPCC,
on the other hand,
explicitly confronted the need to quantify all confidence terms.
Working
Group I, for example, gave the term "likely" a 66 to 90
percent chance
of occurring. Although the IPCC gives a wide range for most of
its
projections, Lomborg generally dismisses these ranges, focusing
on the
least serious outcomes. Not so much as one probability is offered
for
the chance of a dangerous outcome, yet he makes a firm assertion
that
climate "will certainly" not go beyond 2 degrees C
warming in the 22nd
century - a conclusion at variance with the IPCC, other national
climate
assessments and most recent studies in the field of climate
science.
Now let us look in more detail at the four major arguments he
makes in
this chapter.
Climate science. A typical example of Lomborg's method is his
paraphrase
of a secondary source in reporting a 1989 Hadley Center paper in
the
journal Nature in which the researchers make modifications to
their
climate model: "The programmers then improved the cloud
parameterizations in two places, and the model reacted by
reducing its
temperature estimate from 5.2ø C to 1.9ø C." Had this been
first-rate
scholarship, Lomborg would have consulted the original article,
in which
the concluding sentence of the first paragraph presents the
authors'
caveat: "Note that although the revised cloud scheme is more
detailed it
is not necessarily more accurate than the less sophisticated
scheme. "
In a similar vein, he cites Richard S. Lindzen's controversial
stabilizing feedback, or "iris effect," as evidence
that the IPCC
climate sensitivity range should be reduced by a factor of almost
three.
He fails either to understand this mechanism or to tell us that
it is
based on only a few years of data in a small part of one ocean.
Extrapolating this small sample of data to the entire globe is
like
extrapolating the strong destablizing feedback over
midcontinental
landmasses as snow melts during the spring - such an
inappropriate
projection would likely increase estimates of climate sensitivity
by a
factor of several.
As a final example, he quotes a controversial hypothesis from
Danish
cloud physicists that solar magnetic events modulate cosmic rays
and
produce "a clear connection between global lowlevel cloud
cover and
incoming cosmic radiation." The Danish researchers use this
hypothesis
to support an alternative to carbon dioxide for explaining recent
climate change. Lomborg fails to discuss-and I haven't seen it
treated
by the authors of that speculative theory either-what such
purported
changes to this cloud cover have done to the radiative balance of
the
earth. Increasing clouds, it has been well known since papers by
Syukuro
Manabe and Richard T. Wetherald in 1967 and myself in 1972, can
warm or
cool the atmosphere depending on the height of the cloud tops,
the
reflectivity of the underlying surface, the season and the
latitude. The
reason the IPCC discounts this theory is that its advocates have
not
demonstrated any radiative forcing sufficient to match that of
much more
parsimonious theories, such as anthropogenic forcing.
Emissions scenarios. Lomborg asserts that over the next several
decades
new, improved solar machines and other renewable technologies
will crowd
fossil fuels off the market. This will be done so efficiently
that the
IPCC scenarios vastly overestaimte the chance for major increases
in
carbon dioxide. How I wish this would turn out to be true!
But wishes aren't analysis. One study is cited; ignored is the
huge body
of economics work he later accepts to estimate a range of costs
if we
were to implement emissions controls: In fact, most of these
economists
strongly believe high emissionsare quite likely: they usually
project
carbon dioxide doubling to tripling (or more) as
"optimal" economic
policy. I have attacked this literature for failing to point out
that
climate policies that raise the price of conventional fuels spur
investments in alternative energy systems. But such incentives
need
policies first-and Lomborg opposes those very policies. No
credible
analyst can just assert that a fossil-fuel-intensive scenario is
not
plausible-and, typically, he gives no probability that it might
occur.
Cost-benefit calculations. Lomborg's most egregious distortions
and
poorest analyses are his citations of cost-benefit calculations.
First,
he chides the governments that modified the penultimate draft of
the
report from IPCC's Working Group II. These modifications
downgraded the
significance of economic studies that aggregate climate change
damages.
Lomborg says" "A political decision stopped IPCC from
looking at the
total cost-benefit of global warming." (As an aside, I
should mention
that it is strange he chose to cite the penultimate and
preapproval
draft report in this case but didn't mention the very first item
in the
approved summary-that recent temperature trends have caused a
discernible effect on plants and animals. Even more puzzling is
his
failure to discuss ecological impacts in general, focusing
instead on
health and agriculture, sectors he thinks won't be much harmed by
climate change of the minuscule amount he predicts.)
The government representatives downgraded aggregate cost-benefit
studies
for a reason: these studies fail to consider so many categories
of
damages held to be important by political leaders as to render
them just
a guideline on market-sector transactions, not the "total
cost-benefit"
analysis Lomborg wants. A total analysis would have to include
the value
of species lost, crucial ecosystem services degraded, inequity
created
by the poor being hurt more than the rich (which Lomborg does
acknowledge), quality of life reduced (for example, a rise in sea
level
driving small-island inhabitants from traditional homelands), and
likely
changes to climatic extremes and variability .Then again, Lomborg
cites
only one value for climate damages-$5 trillion-even though the
same
economics papers he refers to for costs of climate policy
generally
acknowledge that climate damages can vary from benefits up to
catastrophic losses.
It is precisely because the responsible scientific community
cannot rule
out such catastrophic outcomes at a high level of confidence that
climate mitigation polices are seriously proposed. And to give
one
number-rather than a broad range-for avoided climate damages
defies
explanation, especially when he does give a range for climate
policy
costs. This range, however, is based on the economics literature
but
ignores the findings of engineers. Engineers dispute the
economists'
typical estimates because the economists fail to take into
account
preexisting market imperfections such as energy-inefficient
machines,
houses and processes. These engineering studies, including a
famous one
by five u.s. Department of Energy laboratorieshardly
environmentalradicals-suggest that climate policies that provide
incentives to replace inefficient equipment with more efficient
state-of-the-art products could actually reduce some emissions at
below-zero costs.
The Kyoto Protocol. Lomborg's creation of a 100-year regime for a
decade-Iong protocol is a distortion of the climate policy
process.
Every IPCC report has noted that carbon dioxide emissions need to
be cut
by more than 50 percent below most baseline projections to avoid
large
increases in concentration in the late 21st and 22nd centuries.
Most
analysts know "Kyoto extended" can't make such large
cuts and that both
developed and developing nations
will have to fashion cooperative and cost-effective solutions
over time.
This will take a great deal of learning-bydoing: international
cooperation is not a common experience. Kyoto is a starting
point. And
yet Lomborg, with his creation of a straw-man 100-year
projection, would
squash even this first step.
So what then is "the real state of the world"? Clearly,
it isn't
knowable in traditional statistical terms, even though subjective
estimates can be responsibly offered. The ranges presented by the
IPCC
in its peer-reviewed reports give the best snapshot of the real
state of
climate change: we could be lucky and see a mild effect or
unlucky and
get the catastrophic outcomes. The IPCC frames the issue as a
risk-management decision about hedging. It is not the
everythingwill-turn-out-fine affair that Lomborg would have us
believe.
For such an interdisciplinary topic, the publisher would have
been wise
to ask natural scientists as well as social scientists to review
the
manuscript, which was published by the social science side of the
house.
It's not surprising that the reviewers failed to spot Lomborg's
unbalanced presentation of the natural science, given the
complexity of
the many intertwining fields. But that the natural scientists
weren't
asked is a serious omission for a respectable publisher such as
Cambridge University Press.
Unfortunately, angry reviews such as this one will be the result.
Worse
still, many laypeople and policymakers won't see the reviews and
could
well be tricked into thinking thousands of citations and hundreds
of
pages constitute balanced scholarship. A better rule of thumb is
to see
who talks in ranges and subjective probabilities and to beware of
the
myth busters and "truth tellers."
-----------------
Stephen Schneider, professor in the department of biological
sciences
and senior fellow at the Institute for International Studies at
Stanford
University, is editor of Climatic Change and the Encyclopedia of
Climate
and Weather and lead author of several IPCC chapters and the IPCC
guidance paper on uncertainties.
copyright 2002 Scientific American
==============
(5) GLOBAL WARMING AND CHEAP FOSSIL FULES: THEY'RE GOOD FOR YOU!
>From CO2 Science Magazine, 2 January 202
http://www.co2science.org/journal/2002/v5n1c1.htm.
Reference
Gemmell, I. 2001. Indoor heating, house conditions,
and health.
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 55: 928-929.
What was done
The author conducted a detailed analysis of the answers of 858
respondents to pertinent health and housing questions put to them
in the
second sweep of the "West of Scotland Twenty-07 Study,"
which was
conducted in 1991. The response rate to this survey was
82%, while the
average age of respondents was 59 years.
What was learned
Gemmell's analysis showed that "over and above socioeconomic
factors and
house conditions, inadequate home heating is associated with poor
health
in those aged 55-60." He says, for example, that
"respondents who
reported feeling cold in winter 'most of the time' were over
three times
more likely to suffer from a limiting condition and almost five
times as
likely to report 'fair' or 'poor' self assessed
health." Also noted was
the fact that "living in a cold house will almost certainly
exacerbate
existing conditions and may lead to early mortality."
What it means
In the words of the author, "affordable efficient methods of
home
heating could help reduce the number of people living in homes
that are
detrimental to their health." So also would increases
in minimum air
temperatures help in this regard; while anything that tended to
make
methods of home heating more expensive would be
counterproductive.
On this basis, therefore, the Kyoto Protocol and other such
regulatory
schemes clearly have three strikes against them: (1) their stated
objective of combating global warming, which appears to be most
robust
at the low end of the temperature scale, (2) their inclination to
make
fossil fuel use more costly, and (3) the fact that this policy
will hurt
most those who can least afford to heat their homes, i.e., the
world's
poor.
So it has ever been; and so, it seems, it ever shall be: the poor
are
always the ones to suffer most. And unless enough good
people step
forward to do something about it, the cycle will not be broken.
Copyright © 2002. Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and
Global
Change
=============
(6) PHILOSOPHY 101: GLOBAL WARMING MYTHS VS. EMPIRICISM
>From Tech Central Station, 13 December 2001
http://www.techcentralstation.com/EnviroScienceTechnology.asp?id=114
By Philip Stott, Emeritus Professor of Biogeography in the
University of
London
I think it's time to re-examine the concept of "global
warming" more
philosophically.
Weather and climate change every second, of every minute, of
every day,
of every week, of every year, of every decade, of every century,
of
every millennium, of every eon. There is no such thing as a
stable, or
"sustainable," climate. Temperature is accordingly
never static; it is
always either rising or falling.
Thus, to say that we are now experiencing "global
warming" is little
more than a half-truism, assuming that rising and falling
temperatures
approximately equal out through time. Around 50% of the time we
must be
"warming." Therefore, as long as our scientific
instruments are
sufficiently capable of measuring the rising or the falling,
global
warming and global cooling are, in a certain sense, matters of
fact.
This is global warming seen as an empirical entity. Yet at this
level,
we still don't know whether we are currently warming or cooling
on a
longer, meaningful time scale. Some temperature curves continue
to hint
at a slight recent cooling overall from the 1930s and 1940s, as
do
certain corrected satellite and balloon measurements, while there
are
even climate models that indicate future cooling. In addition,
there
remain grave doubts about the reliability of our temperature
measurements over the oceans as well as on the land because of
the
so-called urban "heat-island" effect.
Despite all this, since the late-1980s, "global
warming" has been turned
into much more than the subject of empirical scientific inquiry.
It has
been re-constructed as a semi-empirical entity, an incomplete
symbol,
which cannot be easily verified or falsified. In this sense, it
has
become what Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) called in his Critique of
Judgment
a matter of opinion. It has become an "object of empirical
knowledge
which is at least in principle possible, but is impossible for us
because the degree to which we are capable of empirical cognition
is not
sufficiently high."
It is thus in the same category as the example recalled by
Stephan
Körner, namely, the assumption that other planets are inhabited
by
rational beings. While such semi-empirical entities are possible,
they
are ultimately neither verifiable nor falsifiable because of the
continuing technical limitations involved.
The technical limitations of our current climate models and
knowledge
are, to put it bluntly, horrendous. Even the Intergovernmental
Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) admits openly that we know next-to-nothing
about
75% of the main factors implicated. We therefore cannot allow the
global
warming alarmists' key antinomy to pass unchallenged: namely,
that while
climate is an exceedingly complex non-linear chaotic system, we
can
control climate by adjusting just one set of factors.
While the phenomenon of global warming is an empty worry,
fundamentally
unverifiable and unfalsifiable in a strict scientific sense, it
is one
that has been empowered with a greater meaning by those who have
the
motive to do so. Accordingly, and perhaps unsurprisingly, since
the
early 1990s its intrinsic linguistic emptiness has been filled by
a
mighty myth, especially in Europe. This myth asserts that current
global
warming is both faster and worse than at any previous time, that
it is
not natural, but must be caused by human hubris, and that the
main
culprit has to be the United States.
The concept has been translated into a matter of faith,
transcending
"the theoretical use of reason." For the good folk
involved, following
Kant, global warming has become neither a matter of knowledge nor
of
opinion, but wholly a matter of morality.
The threat of global warming has, as a result, morphed into the
world's
public enemy #1, al-Qaeda notwithstanding. It is the ultimate
product of
the Mordor of the present age, George W. Bush starring as Sauron,
"Lord
of the Rings," with his genetically modified orcs and
spouting
smokestack industries. It is the inevitable outcome of a Faustian
pact
with the devils of capitalism, industrial growth, and profit. It
is
Christ tempted down from the High Places to the ruin of the
modern
world. It is the "Shire" of Europe against all the
metal, mills and
putrid production of an Erin Brockovich America. It is Harry
Potter
versus the Quirrells of greed and gas guzzling.
Dangerously, we have allowed all of this myth-making to lead to
the
Kyoto Protocol, to the foolish assumption that we can actually
create a
"sustainable," unchanging climate (an oxymoron if ever
there was one).
The Kyoto Protocol is a scientific and economic nonsense that
will cost
the world dear in economic terms while doing absolutely nothing
the stop
our ever-changing climate. And the idea that climate change is
bad for
all is thoroughly challenged in a new book, "Global Warming
and the
American Economy" (Edward Elgar Publishing), edited by the
economist,
Robert O. Mendelsohn, of Yale University School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies.
So, please, let's get more philosophical about global warming.
And
instead of throwing yet more good money after bad by trying to
halt the
inexorable and the inevitable, let's use that money more wisely
to help
lesser developed countries (LDCs) to grow stronger economies that
will
enable them to cope better with change -- whether hot, wet, cold,
or
dry.
Philip Stott is Emeritus Professor of Biogeography in the
University of
London. His latest book, with Dr. Sian Sullivan, is
"Political Ecology:
Science, Myth and Power" (Arnold and OUP, 2000). Philip also
hosts the
'AntiEcohype' web site.
Copyright 2001, Tech Central Station
=============
(7) WEIGHING THE WORDS: GETTING THE BIAS OUT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMUNICATIONS
>From The Reason Public Policy Institite, October 2001
http://www.rppi.org/pu12.html
By Kenneth Green, D.Env.
Deputy Director, Chief Scientist
Reason Public Policy Institute
Environmental science is a highly complex field that draws on the
core
sciences of biology, physics, and chemistry to gain holistic
understanding of natural systems. Environmental policy adds
another
layer of complexity, drawing on engineering, decision theory,
law, and
the study of public policy in general.
For environmental policy to achieve the practical goal of a more
healthful environment, policies must be based on accurate
information
that faithfully reflects the complexity of environmental, health,
and
safety problems.
Claims of bias have long been a problem in landmark environmental
reports put forward by groups such as the Intergovernmental Panel
on
Climate Change (IPCC), the United States Environmental Protection
Agency
(EPA), and other governmental entities (1). Similar charges have
also been
lodged against environmental science textbooks (2).
Recently, the subject of bias came to a head in the state of
Texas, when
Texas Public Policy Foundation and Texas Citizens for a Sound
Economy
challenged proposed science textbooks for grades six through
eight (3).
Some might claim that bias is in the eye of the beholder, or that
there
is no good way to evaluate long documents or textbooks for bias
in any
rigorous, objective way. But this is clearly not true. Thinkers
from
Aristotle onward have developed well-defined systems for
identification
of bias and fallacy.
Ostensibly unbiased environmental publications, whether landmark
government reports, or environmental textbooks intended to
educate the
next generation of possible public policy makers and influencers,
should
be thoroughly and quantitatively evaluated for the degree of bias
and
fallacy in their content. Such an analysis of biases and
fallacies
should include the identification and quantification of the
classical
fallacies and biases that undermine "critical
thinking," such as:
Certainty Bias:- Over- or under-representation of the true state
of
certainty regarding a given claim, as determined from the weight
of
available evidence;
Selectivity Bias: - Selective use of data or, time-frame, or
inclusion
of available policy options or ramifications, to support a point
that
would not be supportable using the full spectrum of available
data;
Order Bias:- Using the order in which claims are presented to
emphasize
their positivity or negativity;
Qualifier Bias: - Selective use of qualifiers ("may
be," "might be,"
"will definitely," etc.) to push the reader in one
direction or another;
Imagery Bias:- Selective use of imagery to influence the readers'
emotional associations with the data;
Perspective Bias:- Selecting perspectives (timeframes, arbitrary
geographic areas, etc.) for interpreting or presenting
information that
make something seem different than it would be in larger or
longer
perspectives;
Unjustified Conclusions: - Conclusions drawn improperly from
available
data, or conclusions drawn from non-existent data;
Static Perspective:- Presenting certain situations as static
(when they
are dynamic), or vice versa;
False Cause:- Attributing an effect to a certain cause without
substantiation;
Personal Attack: - Assigning labels to people in order to
discredit
their point of view, i.e., "climate skeptics,"
"pro-industry groups,"
"radical environmentalists," etc.;
Appeal to the Masses: - The invocation of large numbers of people
to
lend authority to a concept the validity of which is not
determined by
consensus (i.e., "the majority of scientists think
that..."); and
Appeal to Authority:- The citing of a high- profile expert
(whether in
the same field, or another field) as the validation of a concept,
rather
than the citation of the underlying evidence for that concept.
Such biases and fallacies can be identified clearly by the
practiced
eye, and can be handled quantitatively, can be validated
objectively,
and can be used to establish "cut-points" for
acceptability.
There are many ways that such biases could be quantified, and the
best
method will depend on the nature of the documents involved. In
the
simplest case, bias levels could be expressed as a percentage of
declarative statements that are biased, paired with the direction
of
that bias, and indicating whether the work favors or opposes
certain
conclusions. Using this approach, one might summarize one's
findings
this way: "Of all declarative statements made in this work,
X percent
were found to suffer from one or another type of bias or fallacy,
creating an overall bias in the direction of the Y point of
view."
But not all statements are of equal import. Statements that are
based on
implicit or explicit assumptions, that draw conclusions, or make
recommendations, are arguably more important for use in
identifying bias
than are simple statements of fact or scientific principles.
Thus, an
alternate approach to quantifying bias might focus in on those
particular types of sentences, producing a conclusion in this
form: "Of
all conclusive statements made in this work, X percent were found
to
embody one or another type of bias or fallacy, creating an
overall bias
in the direction of the Y point of view."
For long documents, or environmental textbooks, summaries alone
might be
evaluated, or random sampling could be done through the document
to
establish rougher, but still valid estimations of bias or
fallacy. In
these cases, the nature of the sampling should be clearly
explained
along with the findings.
While this or a related approach can produce an objective,
verifiable
measure of bias, what constitutes an acceptable level of bias is
not an
objective decision. That decision must ultimately be determined
and
defended by those who intend to use the document, or those who
produced
it.
The bias evaluation approach described here might prove
particularly
useful for those pursuing the elimination of bias from
environmental
reports and textbooks, particularly those documents expected to
be
unbiased presentations of the scientific state of knowledge.
Eliminating bias in environmental textbooks and official summary
reports
by government agencies has garnered increased attention in recent
years,
at both federal and state levels. This is a positive trend, since
minimizing bias and fallacy in documents that will ultimately
guide
environmental policy can only improve understanding of the issues
that
will ultimately guide environmental policy development.
About the Author
Kenneth Green is Chief Scientist at Reason Public Policy
Institute, and
has served as an expert reviewer on several prominent reports of
the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. He has reviewed
environmental
textbooks for an independent publisher of science textbooks for
middle-school students, and is under contract to write a textbook
on
global warming for the same audience.
Endnotes
1. Richard A. Kerr, "Rising Global Temperature, Rising
Uncertainty,"
News Focus, Science, vol. 292, April 13, 2001; Richard S.
Lindzen,
"Testimony of Richard S. Lindzen before the Senate
Environment and
Public Works Committee," Washington, D.C., May 2, 2001;
Brent Bozell,
"Flat Earth Environmental Reporting," Creators
Syndicate, July 10, 1997.
2. Michael Sanera, "Environmental Education, Promise and
Performance,"
Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, vol. 3, Spring 1998
pp.
9-26.
3. R.A. Dyer, "State Told Proposed Textbooks Biased,
Flawed,"
Star-Telegram, September 7, 2001; Duggan Flanakin," Texas
Environmental
Science Middle School Textbook Review," (San Antonio: Texas
Public
Policy Foundation, 2001).
4. Where "bias" refers to an objectively verifiable
frequency of
one-sided presentation, and fallacy refers to objectively
verifiable
violation of one or another tenet of logic or critical thinking.
This
list does not represent every known form of bias or fallacious
reasoning
and is not intended to be a definitive treatment of these issues.
The
biases and fallacies listed here are, however, those that the
author has
seen to predominate in environmental publications. For more on
logical
fallacies, see Don Lindsay, "A List of Fallacious Arguments,
www.don-lindsay-archive.org/skeptic/arguments.html,
October 19, 2001.
© The Reason Foundation. All rights reserved.
============
(8) FACING ECONOMIC CRISIS, JAPAN CASTS ASIDE KYOTO AGREEMENT
>From CNN, 30 December 2001
http://asia.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/30/japan.kyoto/index.html
TOKYO, Japan -- Japan has effectively abandoned the Kyoto
Protocol
limiting greenhouse gas emissions, according to a report released
Sunday.
Japanese industry groups have forced the government to drop
mandatory
restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto
agreement,
making it unlikely Tokyo will be able to meet its reduction
targets, the
Yomiuri newspaper said.
The decision by an Environment Ministry policy board, under
pressure
from corporate lobbies, to impose only voluntary limits on carbon
dioxide emissions would spell doom for Japan's six percent
reduction
goal.
The newspaper quoted an unidentified member of the panel, which
is
drafting Japan's strategy to fight global warming, as saying
there is
nothing in its upcoming report that directly commits companies to
cut
back on polluting.
Economic slump blamed
Reducing emissions by 6 percent from the benchmark year of 1990
will be
all the more formidable for Japan because the nation's carbon
dioxide
levels have risen about 17 percent over the past decade.
The nation's deep economic slump is also likely to make corporate
Japan
fight harder against any measures that increase the costs of
production.
Japan plans to ratify the international treaty on global warming
in
June, 2002 during its regular session of Parliament.
Seeing the protocol to fruition is a matter of national pride for
Japan,
which basked in the international attention of brokering the deal
in
1997.
However, after the United States pulled out of the pact in March,
Japan
questioned whether there was any meaning in ratifying it without
the
world's biggest industrial power -- and polluter -- on board.
Japan's decision to ratify the protocol came in November, months
after
European nations had collectively announced they would approve
the
treaty even without Washington's participation.
Copyright 2002, CNN
==========
(9) SCIENCE, ECONOMICS SLAY KYOTO DRAGON: JAPAN JOINS U.S.
>From Tech Central Station, 2 January 2001
http://www.techcentralstation.com/EnviroScienceTechnology.asp?id=120
By: Willie Soon and Sallie Baliunas, Co-Host, Tech Central
Station and
Associate of the Harvard College Observatory
The Kyoto Protocol's chickens are coming home to roost all over
the
globe - and it's not a pretty sight. As government ministers
begin to
get a better understanding of the true economic impact of the
carbon
dioxide emission restrictions called for in the Protocol,
political
fissures are emerging that threaten to sink the treaty faster
than
carbon dioxide in a lush New Zealand forest.
Japan just joined the United States in rejecting Kyoto's mandated
carbon
dioxide cuts. The country where the Protocol was drafted ranks
third
worldwide in carbon dioxide emission and is mired by a slumped
economy.
The carbon dioxide cuts would be economically punishing to nearly
all
developed countries, and that economic disaster would cascade
disastrously to developing economies of the world.
Japan will still focus on voluntary cuts as a hedge against fears
of
"consumer boycotting [in Europe and other areas that support
the Kyoto
treaty]," according to one Japanese government source.
Oh, Canada!
To our north, the Canadian Minister of Industry recently said
"there is
a very strong consensus around the Cabinet table and in caucus
that
Canada must do nothing in competitive terms that would handcuff
our
capacity to compete around the world and with United
States."
Rick Hyndman, senior policy advisor of climate change for the
Canadian
Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), added "The
position of CAPP,
and most industry I think, is not opposition to the protocol, per
se,
but opposition to ratification before it's evaluated. Most people
in
industry think it's very difficult to do a serious analysis of
policy
options and a serious consultation with shareholders by
mid-2002."
But David Anderson, the Minister of Environment, quickly stressed
to the
Canadian public that Prime Minister Jean Chretien will make the
final
decision on ratification by mid-2002 - less than the time
Canadian
businesses feel necessary to evaluate the consequences.
'EU'thanasia for the Treaty
Across the Atlantic, the European Union (EU) has an umbrella plan
to cap
carbon dioxide emission averaged over EU countries. The scheme
punishes
the worst polluters by imposing financial penalties. This EU move
is
unsurprising for the EU has been trumpeting itself as the
"climate
savior" of the Kyoto Protocol.
But then came stunning comments from the German Economic
Minister,
Werner Mueller. Discussing the Green Party's ambitious goal of
cutting
carbon dioxide emissions 40% by 2020, Mueller said that such cuts
would
have "considerable costs for the economy, which would also
hit private
consumers." Mueller is naturally concerned about the
long-term economic
competitiveness of Germany.
A spokesman from the German Environmental Ministry hastily
contradicted
Mueller's comment by asserting that "the 40 percent target
is
achievable, and will also create jobs." The Ministry
provided no details
on how Germany can both cut its emissions by 40% and create
sustained
economic growth and hence more jobs. Without a Green Party
endorsement
of new nuclear power plants - a political impossibility -- the
energy
demands of a vibrant economy such as Germany's cannot be met.
Common Sense Kiwis
And how about the green pastures of the South Pacific? New
Zealand has
about 50 million sheep and cattle whose combined effects from
belching
and flatulence produces about 44% of New Zealand's inventory of
total
greenhouse gas emission. One proposal to limit greenhouse gas
emissions
from its sheep and cattle industries was to impose a flatulence
tax of
$6.40 per sheep and $25.60 per head of cattle. After farmers
protested,
the flatulence tax was abandoned.
New Zealand's prime minister has called incorporating carbon
sinks into
the total emissions calculus a political non-starter, despite the
country's vast forests and green spaces. But without factoring
those in,
the economic impact of Kyoto will be devastating to the Kiwis. An
economic assessment produced by the New Zealand's Institute of
Economic
Research in December found that, in 15 years, New Zealand's GDP
would be
18% lower than it would have been without the Kyoto emission
cuts. This
new report also cautioned that "New Zealand should be
extremely cautious
about enforcing any emission abatement on its domestic economy in
the
absence of a global regime."
According to the latest global emissions report from the United
Nation's
Environmental Programme, 21 out of 35 industrialized countries
will not
reach their Kyoto targets if no drastic measures to cut emissions
are
taken. To date, the average cut for the those 35 industrialized
nations
will have to be about 14% from current levels during the deadline
of
Kyoto Protocol, 2008-2012.
Moreover, the U.S. would have to cut its greenhouse gas emissions
by
about 25% from present-day values. Similarly, Canada would have
to cut
20%, Australia by 16%, Japan and Norway both by 21%.
Under this new world order of international climate diplomacy,
powerful
emitters like China -- which will be out-emitting the United
States in a
few years -- and India are exempt from the current responsibility
of
emission cuts. Meanwhile, Russia is ramping up its petroleum
recovery,
possibly doubling it to 12 million barrels per day, while it
ranks third
in carbon dioxide emissions. Yet Kyoto requires that Russia need
not cut
below its 1990 emission levels. The impact of the protocol's
sophisticated equation of country-by-country limitations and
permissiveness in emissions means that the air's concentration of
carbon
dioxide will not meaningfully change. In other words, the claimed
climate catastrophes - unfounded by the most reliable scientific
evidence - remain unaddressed by the protocol's complexities.
It has taken several years of research and debate, but as a more
complete picture of the costs of Kyoto emerges, government
officials
around the globe are wrestling with the consequences and are
having
second thoughts. That's understandable. And it's a welcome
development
for the new year.
Copyright 2002, Tech Central Station
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