PLEASE NOTE:
*
CCNet CLIMATE SCARES & CLIMATE CHANGE, 22 May 2002
--------------------------------------------------
[The sources from which the blurbs below are taken are not
unbiased and the reader
should, as with any other source of information, consider the
influence of vested interest. bobk]
"Splashy science news reports draw eyeballs and move policy,
but
sometimes the scientific heart of the news comes up short. Worse,
it
can be dead wrong. So what happens in the news when a study is
found to be
faulty or false and ends up being retracted or thrown out? Not
much,
usually. Science news revolves around news -- new studies,
discoveries and
achievements. The discovery that previous research has been
dis-proven or
shown to be worth less than the paper it was printed on just does
not
register as news to most journalists, no matter how said research
was
originally hyped to the public."
--Howard Fienberg, Tech Central Station, 20 May 2002
(1) HOLOCENE CLIMATE RECORDS
CO2 Science Magazine, 22 May 2002
(2) LIMITATIONS OF CLIMATE MODELS AS PREDICTORS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, 16 May
2002
(3) DEMISE OF CARBON SEQUESTATION "FREE RIDE" GREATLY
EXAGGERATED
CO2 Science Magazine, 22 May 2002
(4) IT'LL COST YA': HOW EUROPE WILL SUFFER
Tech Central Station, 21 May 2002
(5) SOLAR DELUSIONS
Tech Central Station, 21 May 2002
(6) BAD SCIENCE NEVER DIES
Tech Central Station, 20 May 2002
==============
(1) HOLOCENE CLIMATE RECORDS
>From CO2 Science Magazine, 22 May 2002
http://www.co2science.org/subject/h/summaries/holoceneasia.htm
To assess the significance of the global warming of the past
century or so,
i.e., to determine whether or not it is man-induced, it is
necessary to see
how the warming of this period compares with that of earlier
periods of
indisputable natural warming. Within this context, we here
review some
recent studies of climate reconstructions of the current
interglacial for
different parts of Asia.
Naurzbaev and Vaganov (2000) developed a continuous near-surface
air
temperature record from tree-ring data obtained from 118 trees
growing near
the timberline in Siberia that covers the period 212 BC to AD
1996, as well
as a 700-year record for the period 3300 to 2600 BC.
Because the
temperature fluctuations they derived agreed well with air
temperature
variations reconstructed from Greenland ice-core data, they
concluded that
"the tree ring chronology of [the Siberian] region can be
used to analyze
both regional peculiarities and global temperature variations in
the
Northern Hemisphere." So what did they find?
The scientists discovered a number of several-hundred-year warm
and cool
periods, including the Medieval Warm Period (AD 850 to 1150), the
Little Ice
Age (AD 200 through 1800), and the current Modern Warm Period. In
regard to
the warming between the latter of these two periods, Naurzbaev
and Vaganov
say it is "not extraordinary" and that "the
warming at the border of the
first and second millennia [i.e., AD 1000] was longer in time and
similar in
amplitude." They also note that temperatures of the
mid-Holocene were
warmer yet, averaging about 3.3°C higher than those of the past
two
millennia.
In another tree-ring study - this one of the Pakistan/Afghanistan
border
region near China and India - Esper et al. (2002) employed more
than 200,000
ring-width measurements from 384 trees obtained from 20
individual sites
ranging from the lower to upper timberline to reconstruct the
climatic
history of Western Central Asia since AD 618. Their work revealed
that early
in the seventh century, the Medieval Warm Period was already
firmly
established. Between AD 900 and 1000, tree growth was
exceptionally rapid,
at rates that they say "cannot be observed during any other
period of the
last millennium." Between AD 1000 and 1200, however,
growing conditions
deteriorated; and at about AD 1500, minimum tree ring-widths were
reached
that persisted well into the seventeenth century. Towards the end
of the
twentieth century, ring-widths increased once again; but the
scientists
report that "the twentieth-century trend does not approach
the AD 1000
maximum." In fact, the Medieval Warm Period was far more
conducive to good
tree growth than the Modern Warm Period. Summing up their work,
Esper et al.
say that "the warmest decades since AD 618 appear between AD
800 and 1000."
Zhuo et al. (1998) reviewed what is known about the mid-Holocene
period in
China, noting that temperatures during the Climatic Optimum in
that part of
the world were also warmer than they are currently, by anywhere
from 2-6°C.
They additionally reported that many glaciers across the country
retreated
during this period, and that some in eastern China disappeared
altogether.
Also, the warmer temperatures of the mid-Holocene resulted in a
retreat of
the southern permafrost limit to 100 km north of its current
position.
Yafeng et al. (1999) analyzed a 2000-year high-resolution ð18O
record
obtained from the Guliya ice cap located in the Qinghai-Tibet
Plateau of
China. Their data clearly depicted the Dark Ages Cold
Period of the middle
of the first millennium AD, the warmth of the subsequent Medieval
Warm
Period, and the following "well-defined 'Little Ice
Age'," which in that
part of the world appeared to last until 1930. Perhaps the
most striking of
their findings, however, was the occurrence of over 30 abrupt
climatic
shifts on the order of 3°C that took place over but two or three
decades.
The Holocene in Asia, as depicted by these several records, was a
period of
millennial-scale climatic oscillations, the warm and cool nodes
of which are
typified by the Medieval Warm Period and Little Ice Age. Another
distinctive
feature of the Holocene was its peak mid-period warmth, when
temperatures
were considerably higher than they are currently, but when
atmospheric CO2
concentrations were much lower. Also evident in the Holocene
record of Asia
are many rapid shifts in temperature, which - on the Guliya ice
cap, at
least - were even more dramatic than the
"unprecedented" warming that is
claimed by the IPCC to have occurred during the last decades of
the 20th
century.
In view of these real-world observations, there appears to be
nothing
unusual about the planet's current climatic state or its recent
climate
dynamics, particularly in Asia. In fact, the data of Esper et al.
suggest
that the Modern Warm Period still has a long ways to go before it
can be
said to be equivalent to the Medieval Warm Period. Hence, there
would appear
to be little reason to suggest that the hand of man is evident in
the global
warming of the past century or so. Indeed, we would say
there is no reason
to make such an inference.
References
Esper, J., Schweingruber, F.H. and Winiger, M. 2002.
1300 years of
climatic history for Western Central Asia inferred from
tree-rings. The
Holocene 12: 267-277.
Naurzbaev, M.M. and Vaganov, E.A. 2000. Variation of
early summer and
annual temperature in east Taymir and Putoran (Siberia) over the
last two
millennia inferred from tree rings. Journal of Geophysical
Research 105:
7317-7326.
Yafeng, S., Tandong, Y. and Bao, Y. 1999. Decadal
climatic variations
recorded in Guliya ice core and comparison with the historical
documentary
data from East China during the last 2000 years. Science in
China Series D
- Earth Sciences 42 Supp.: 91-100.
Zhuo, Z., Baoyin, Y. and Petit-Marie, N. 1998.
Paleoenvironments in China
during the Last Glacial Maximum and the Holocene Optimum.
Episodes 21:
152-158.
Copyright © 2002. Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide
and Global Change
============
(2) LIMITATIONS OF CLIMATE MODELS AS PREDICTORS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
>From NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, 16 May 2002
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba396/
by David R. Legates Download this page in PDF format
World leaders are making critical decisions based upon
predictions of
General Circulation Models or Global Climate Models (GCMs) that
humans are
causing global climate change or global warming. Global climate
models
attempt to describe the earth's climate and are used in variety
of
applications. These include the investigation of the possible
causes of
climate change and the simulation of past and future climates.
But these
models are limited in important ways, including:
an incomplete understanding of the climate system,
an imperfect ability to transform our knowledge into accurate
mathematical equations,
the limited power of computers,
the models' inability to reproduce important atmospheric
phenomena, and
inaccurate representations of the complex natural
interconnections.
These weaknesses combine to make GCM-based predictions too
uncertain to be
used as the bases for public policy responses related to future
climate
changes.
Nor is this the worst that can happen. These numbers are based on
the
intermediate (most likely) projections of the Social Security
Board of
Trustees. Under the trustees' pessimistic projection, by 2050 the
total
taxes needed to support elderly benefits will climb to 53 percent
of taxable
payroll. On this projection, we have already pledged more than
half of the
incomes of future workers - most of whom are not yet born and
none of whom
have agreed to be part of a chain-letter approach to funding
retirement
benefits.
The Limits of Human Knowledge.
The world's best scientists have only an incomplete understanding
of how the
various atmospheric, land surface, oceanic and ice components
interact. Even
if their understanding of the climate system were perfect,
scientists would
still face challenges. Consider that while scientists do have a
general idea
of the complex interrelationships of the atmosphere and the
oceans,
expressing this knowledge mathematically is very difficult.
The Limits of Computing Power.
GCMs are limited in important ways. Global climate is produced
through a
variety of processes and interactions that operate on a wide
range of
scales, including molecular, regional, continental and global.
Changes in
climate occur from physical interactions that take place on any
or all of
these scales. The changes, and the resulting weather patterns,
can occur
nearly instantaneously or they can take decades or millenia to
develop.
Unfortunately, the computers and programs that run the GCMs are
limited to
gross representations of the geographic, geologic and atmospheric
details
that they use to run climate simulations. Thus, many small-scale
features,
such as a temporary but significant shift in the prevailing winds
or
unusually dry surface conditions due to increased evaporation
from forest
fires and high winds cannot be represented, even though they may
significantly impact the local, regional, or even global climate.
Indeed, GCMs can at best represent only a thumbnail sketch of the
real
world, with spatial resolutions no finer than regional areas a
thousand
miles square. Many topographical, geological, atmospheric and
biological
variations can occur within any contiguous thousand square miles.
For
instance, GCM's might average rainfall amounts and wind velocity
over large
diverse land surfaces which could include arid mountain plateaus,
low-land
deserts and temperate coastal rainforests. But, even modest
topographic
changes - for instance, a new housing development that paves over
farmland
and drains a wetland area - could render a model of land-surface
interactions inaccurate.
Resulting Model Breakdowns.
Given the limitations noted, GCMs simply cannot reliably
reproduce climate
systems. Commonplace events like precipitation and the passage of
typical
weather fronts are difficult enough to depict; truly complex
phenomena, such
as, hurricanes, thunderstorms, and tornadoes may be represented
so poorly
that they simply cannot be relied upon. El Niño, La Niña and
the Pacific
Decadal Oscillation are examples of complex climate patterns that
are
inadequately reproduced or completely absent in GCMs.
In addition, global average temperature is measured by three
different
instruments - ground-based thermometers, weather balloons and
global
satellite observations - with each system covering a slightly
different
range of the earth's atmosphere. The data they provide is
conflicting.
Whereas, both the global satellite network and weather balloon
observations
show a modest cooling trend during the past 25 years, the
ground-based
thermometers show a modest warming of approximately 0.13 degrees
Celsius per
decade.
The GCMs display two flaws related to measured global
temperatures. First,
they show global temperatures rising across all levels of the
atmosphere, a
finding not reflected in reality. [See figure.] Second, the
lowest predicted
global temperature measurement of the GCMs is nearly three times
more than
the temperature rise measured by ground-based thermometers. Thus,
the GCMs
do not reflect the temperature differences or the direction of
temperature
change within various levels of the atmosphere, nor do they show
the actual
amount of temperature change.
Finally, GCMs ignore the interconnected nature of climate
processes and how
an inaccurate simulation of one introduces errors into every
other related
process. A simple model for precipitation involves scores of
variables. But
a single error, say in representing atmospheric moisture or
deciding what
mechanism is causing precipitation, will make the simulation
"wrong." For
example, precipitation requires moisture in the atmosphere and a
mechanism
to force it to condense (i.e., by forcing the air to rise over
mountains, by
surface heating, as a result of weather fronts or by cyclonic
rotation). Any
errors in representing either the atmospheric moisture content or
the
precipitation-causing mechanisms will produce an erroneous
simulation. Thus,
GCM simulations of precipitation will be affected by limitations
in the
representation and simulation of topography.
Inaccuracies in simulating precipitation will, in turn, adversely
affect the
simulation of virtually every other climate variable.
Condensation releases
heat to the atmosphere and forms clouds, which reflect energy
from the sun
and trap heat from the earth's surface - and both sources of heat
affect air
temperature. This in turn affects winds, atmospheric pressure and
atmospheric circulation. Since winds drive the upper currents of
the ocean,
the simulation of ocean circulation also is adversely affected.
Additionally, inadequate simulations of precipitation lead to
inaccurate
assessments of soil moisture. Since vegetation also responds to
precipitation, the entire representation of the biosphere becomes
open to
question. This is not to say that climate scientists lack skill
or
dedication; it is to reiterate the extraordinary difficulty of
producing
accurate climate models.
More than just long-term average and seasonal variations go into
estimating
the extent of climate change. Climate change is likely to
manifest itself in
small regional fluctuations. Moreover, year-to-year variability
is
important. Much of the character of the earth's climate is in how
it varies
over time. GCMs that simulate essentially the same conditions
year after
year, as virtually all climate models do, miss an important
aspect of the
earth's climate. Thus GCMs' predictive powers must be evaluated
in light of
each model's ability to represent the global climate's holistic
and variable
nature.
Although GCMs are not weather prediction models, climate is
nevertheless an
ensemble of weather events. The utility of a climate model is not
in
predicting whether it will rain in northern Florida on a certain
afternoon.
What is of interest is to determine the long-term probability
that future
precipitation will be significantly different - in frequency
and/or
intensity - from what it is today. Will the winter of 2048 be
warmer or
colder, wetter or drier than present conditions, and if so, by
how much? If
climate models cannot simulate processes known to drive daily
weather
patterns, to what degree can GCM's climate predictions be
believed?
Conclusion.
Climate is to some degree a representation of the average of
weather events
that occur. If the frequency and locations of weather events are
simulated
inaccurately or not at all, the reliability of climate change
prognostications is undermined. While GCMs cannot be expected to
simulate
future weather, they should be able to accurately depict the
earth's present
climate and vitality. Since they cannot, GCM predictions of
climate change
are statistical exercises with little bearing on reality.
David R. Legates, Director Center for Climatic Research
University of
Delaware Newark and adjunct scholar with the NCPA.
===========
(3) DEMISE OF CARBON SEQUESTATION "FREE RIDE" GREATLY
EXAGGERATED
>From CO2 Science Magazine, 22 May 2002
http://www.co2science.org/edit/v5_edit/v5n21edit.htm
A Duke University press release dated 15 May 2002 heralds the
"end of [the]
'free ride' on ecosystem CO2 absorption." The free
ride to which the
document refers is the historical and still-ongoing increase in
the capacity
of the world's soils to store carbon as a consequence of the
historical and
still-ongoing increase in the growth of the planet's vegetation
that has
been driven by the historical and still-ongoing increase in the
air's CO2
content that has been associated with the demise of the last
great ice age
and the inception and progression of the Industrial Revolution.
Stimulated by the gradually intensifying aerial fertilization
effect of this
rise in the atmosphere's CO2 concentration, earth's plants
extracted ever
increasing amounts of the CO2 that went into the air during this
long period
of time and sequestered its carbon in their tissues and the soils
in which
they grew. Consequently, were it not for this increasingly
voracious
appetite of the globe's plants for carbon dioxide - the more CO2
there is in
the air, the more of it they absorb - the air's CO2 content would
have risen
much higher than it actually has, and it currently would be
rising nearly
twice as fast as it actually is.
The Duke University press release appears to readily accept all
of this past
good news. With respect to the future, however, it has
nothing encouraging
to say. In fact, it states that the CO2-enhanced
sequestration of carbon
will shortly come to an end, and that we will therefore soon be
looking at
yearly atmospheric CO2 increases "that are double what they
are now."
The basis for this pessimistic and, we believe, erroneous
contention is the
recently published paper of Gill et al. (2002), wherein the
authors describe
their multi-year study of carbon sequestration in the soils of
several
portions of a Texas grassland ecosystem that were maintained
under a variety
of atmospheric CO2 concentrations, ranging from just over 220 to
just over
560 µmol CO2 per mol air (µmol mol-1). The Duke
University press release
refers to this experiment as a "precise ecosystem
study," and in nearly all
respects, that description is correct. In the case of the
most crucial
measurement of all (soil organic carbon content), however, the
word precise
is totally inappropriate, if not outright wrong; for it is
notoriously
difficult to accurately measure the relatively small changes in
soil organic
carbon content that occur over periods of a few short years,
which in this
specific instance numbered but three.
Consider, for example, the data of Figure 1, which we have
carefully
extracted from a figure in the Gill et al. paper. The
scatter in the data
is tremendous, especially in the mid-CO2-range, where the
difference between
the high and low extremes of the three-year soil organic carbon
content
change is considerably greater than the difference between what
would be
calculated from the beginning and end points of any reasonable
trend line
that might be fit to the data. So what did Gill et al. do
to conclude -
from these highly imprecise data - that the ability of earth's
ecosystems to
continue to enhance their capacity to sequester carbon in
response to future
increases in the air's CO2 content would soon be coming to an
end?
Figure 1. [ http://www.co2science.org/edit/v5_edit/v5n21edit.htm
] The entire
suite of 1997-2000 changes in the organic carbon content of the
top 15 cm of
soil plotted against atmospheric CO2 concentration. From Gill et
al. (2002).
The group's fatal misstep was trying to coax more out of their
data than
could realistically be delivered. Accepting all of their
widely-dispersed
data points as equally valid, Gill et al. fit a second-order
polynomial to
them, as shown in Figure 2. This functional representation
- which rises
rapidly from the lowest CO2 concentration employed in the study
to a
concentration of approximately 400 µmol mol-1, but then levels
out - serves
as the basis for their contention that the CO2-induced
stimulation of carbon
sequestration that is evident over the first half of the CO2
concentration
range essentially disappears above an atmospheric CO2
concentration of 400
µmol mol-1. That's what their representation of the data
implies, alright.
But is this representation correct?
Figure 2. http://www.co2science.org/edit/v5_edit/v5n21edit.htm
The entire
suite of 1997-2000 changes in the organic carbon content of the
top 15 cm of
soil plotted against atmospheric CO2 concentration, together with
the trend
line fit to the data by Gill et al.
In broaching this question, we begin as Gill et al. did in
another place in
their paper and divide the data of Figure 2 into two groups: a
sub-ambient-CO2 group (comprised of the 10 data points with the
lowest
atmospheric CO2 concentrations) and a super-ambient-CO2 group
(comprised of
the 10 points with the highest atmospheric CO2
concentrations). But instead
of calculating the mean three-year change in the soil organic
carbon content
of each of these groups, as they did, we derive best-fit linear
regressions
for each group, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. http://www.co2science.org/edit/v5_edit/v5n21edit.htm
The
sub-ambient-CO2 and super-ambient-CO2 changes in the organic
carbon content
of the top 15 cm of soil plotted against atmospheric CO2
concentration,
together with the linear regression lines we have fit to the two
groups of
data.
In viewing these results, it can be seen that the sub-ambient-CO2
data - by
themselves - exhibit absolutely no trend in carbon sequestration
with
increasing atmospheric CO2 content (because, of course, of their
high
imprecision); yet this is the CO2 range over which Gill et al.
claim the
strongest - actually, the only - positive carbon sequestration
response to
atmospheric CO2 enrichment. In point of fact, however, the
only way they
can support this contention is via the help they receive from
their
super-ambient-CO2 data; and it is the uncritical way in which
they used
these data that led them to draw their unwarranted conclusion
about rising
CO2 concentrations having little effect upon soil carbon
sequestration above
a concentration of 400 µmol mol-1, as we will now demonstrate.
First of all, it is important to note the great discontinuity
that exists
between the two data sets of Figure 3, i.e., the great jump in
the change in
soil organic carbon content that occurs where the relationship
describing
the first data set ends and the relationship describing the
second data set
begins. One way to resolve this problem - and, hopefully,
make the
discontinuity disappear - would be to acquire many more data
points across
the entire range of atmospheric CO2 concentration that was
investigated.
Unfortunately, the data displayed are all the data that
exist. Hence, a
different approach must be employed; and that approach is to use
less data,
specifically, to delete from the highly-variable population of
imprecise
data points a small number of the most aberrant points.
So, which are "the most aberrant points"? Logic
would suggest they are the
ones that make the biggest contribution to the patently unreal
discontinuity
between the two groups of data. Can you guess which ones
they are? That's
right. They are the first two (lowest-CO2-value) data
points of the
super-ambient-CO2 group. Removing those two data points
does more to make
the two groups of data compatible with each other than does the
removal of
any other two data points of either group.
When these highly aberrant data points are thus deleted, as shown
in Figure
4, the data that remain are best described by a simple straight
line; and
that straight line implies that there is no detectable change in
the
CO2-induced stimulation of soil carbon sequestration over the
entire range
of atmospheric CO2 concentration investigated by Gill et
al. And that is
the only conclusion that can validly be drawn from their data.
Figure 4. http://www.co2science.org/edit/v5_edit/v5n21edit.htm
The changes
in the organic carbon content of the top 15 cm of soil plotted
against
atmospheric CO2 concentration, with the two most aberrant of the
imprecise
data points removed, together with the linear regression we have
fit to the
data.
To emphasize this point, we have also fit a second-order
polynomial (the
functional form preferred by Gill et al.) to the data of Figure
4, obtaining
the result depicted in Figure 5. Interestingly, although
the result is
indeed a curve, one really has to squint to see it. In
fact, the curvature
of the line is so slight that its graphical representation in
Figure 5 is
virtually indistinguishable from the straight line of Figure 4;
and it
possesses essentially the same R2 value. Hence, and once
again, it is
abundantly clear there is no defensible basis for claiming
anything about
the response of soil carbon sequestration in this Texas grassland
ecosystem
to the range of atmospheric CO2 enrichment employed in this study
beyond
what is suggested by the results of Figures 4 and 5, i.e., that
the response
is linear.
Figure 5. http://www.co2science.org/edit/v5_edit/v5n21edit.htm
The changes
in the organic carbon content of the top 15 cm of soil plotted
against
atmospheric CO2 concentration, with the two most aberrant of the
imprecise
data points removed, together with the second-order polynomial we
have fit
to the data.
The end result of this more realistic and critical treatment of
the data -
wherein we identify and discard the two most aberrant data points
(10% of
the original 20) - contradicts Gill et al.'s conclusion that the
sequestration of carbon in soils is more responsive to
atmospheric CO2
increases at the low end of the CO2 concentration range they
investigated
than at the high end of that range. In light of the gradual
weakening of
the aerial fertilization effect of atmospheric CO2 enrichment
that is often
observed in experiments as the air's CO2 content is sequentially
elevated,
however, one might logically have expected to see something along
the lines
of what Gill et al. wrongly concluded, although of a much
more muted
nature. Nevertheless, such was not observed. Why?
Part of the answer to this question undoubtedly resides in the
nature of the
photosynthetic responses of the grassland plants to atmospheric
CO2
enrichment. It is interesting to note, for example, that
the CO2-induced
stimulation of the maximum photosynthetic rates of the plants did
not taper
off, as might have been expected, as the air's CO2 content rose,
even at the
highest CO2 concentration investigated. Rather, the
photosynthetic response
was linear, just like that of the change in soil organic carbon
content.
What is even more interesting - even fascinating - in this
regard, is that
the linear responses were maintained in the face of what Gill et
al. say was
a "threefold decrease in nitrogen availability" as the
air's CO2 content
went from its lowest to highest level.
In light of these striking experimental observations, we fiercely
disagree
with Gill et al.'s conclusion that the ability of soils to
continue as
carbon sinks will be severely limited in the near future by
impending
nutrient limitations. Indeed, their own data, when properly
analyzed,
indicate that even with their "threefold decrease" in
soil nitrogen
availability, the soil of the grassland they studied continued to
sequester
ever greater amounts of carbon as the air's CO2 content continued
to rise to
close to 200 µmol mol-1 above the atmosphere's current CO2
concentration.
How sad it is, therefore, that Duke University ecologist Robert
B. Jackson,
on the basis of the Gill et al. paper of which he was a
co-author, would
publicly state, as reported in the Duke University press release,
that "the
current lack of interest by the United States in participating in
the Kyoto
accords is especially unfortunate." In point of fact,
if there is anything
unfortunate here, it is that so many people have been so
egregiously mislead
by Jackson's unsubstantiated declaration; for when properly
considered, the
data of Gill et al. actually imply that earth's vegetation will
yearly
sequester ever more carbon as the CO2 concentration of the
atmosphere
continues to rise, thereby exerting an increasingly more powerful
brake on
the rate of increase in the air's CO2 content and reducing the
potential for
deleterious global warming.
So climb aboard the fossil-fueled biospheric train, folks, the
ride is still
free!
Dr. Sherwood B. Idso, President
Dr. Keith E. Idso, Vice President
Reference
Gill, R.A., Polley, H.W., Johnson, H.B., Anderson, L.J.,
Maherali, H. and
Jackson, R.B. 2002. Nonlinear grassland responses to
past and future
atmospheric CO2. Nature 417: 279-282.
Copyright © 2002. Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide
and Global Change
===========
(4) IT'LL COST YA': HOW EUROPE WILL SUFFER
>From Tech Central Station, 21 May 2002
http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051-450&CID=1051-051702A
By Duane D. Freese 05/17/2002
When serious people examine problems, they usually look at it
from all
angles.
Many leaders on the world scene probably figured they had all the
angles
covered when 100 nations agreed last fall to implement a program
to reduce
emissions of so-called greenhouse gases. But recent studies
demonstrate they
missed a big one -- economics.
The United States government had to explore the economics of
climate change
after Vice President Al Gore negotiated the Kyoto protocol in
1997 to cut
greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels. Prior to Kyoto, the
Clinton
administration received a 95-0 injunction by the Senate not to
send it a
treaty that would substantially harm the U.S. economy. So the
administration
handed over to the Energy Department the job of figuring out what
implementing Kyoto would cost.
The result didn't satisfy Kyoto backers within the
administration. The study
turned up a cost by 2010 -- at the midpoint of the 2008-12 period
for
meeting Kyoto's strictures -- of 2% to 4% of GDP. In other words,
in the
best of circumstances, it would cost about $200 billion and
millions of jobs
to cut U.S. emissions from the burning of fossil fuels 7% below
1990 levels.
No astute political observer believed then or now that the Senate
would
ratify such a blow to the economy. And Clinton, despite some
attempts by
administration economists to brighten Kyoto's numbers, never
submitted the
protocol to the Senate for approval.
Despite this, when President Bush -- relying on the Clinton
Energy
Department and other studies indicating the deal provided plenty
of economic
pain for almost no environmental gain -- dumped the deal three
months after
taking office, howls emanated from Kyoto backers, both here and
in Europe.
So the decision to go ahead with the protocol last fall despite
the United
States' withdrawal from the agreement prompted the Bush
administration to
come up with an alternative. Bush's Clear Skies proposal, calling
for a
voluntary emissions trading program as part of an effort to
increase energy
intensity by 18% over the next decade, didn't win the president
any points
in Europe.
Germany's Environment Minister Juergen Trittin called the
proposal a major
disappointment. His counterpart in France, Yves Cochet, called on
the
European Union to push Bush to ratify Kyoto "without
delay." And a European
Union spokesmen reiterated that the Kyoto protocol remained
"the best
framework for taking action."
Well, it's pretty easy to push for action in the abstract.
Nothing needs to
be done immediately; compliance, after all, begins six years
hence. But
since last fall, few governments have stepped forward to take
concrete steps
to reduce their nation's emissions.
The European Parliament -- not to be confused with the sovereign
governments
of each of the European Union members -- has "ratified"
Kyoto. But it
remains to be seen whether all the 15 members of the EU will
ratify the
protocol by June 1, as an unexpected development has cropped up
that may
force EU nations to actually make emissions cuts that many didn't
intend.
On April 30, the European Environment Agency (EEA) reported that
the
downward trend in emissions that Europe enjoyed through most of
the 1990s
had reversed. In 1999, emissions for the EU as a whole had
dropped by 3.8%
from 1990 levels, nearly half the 8% target for the union. The
success of
the EU was built on three things - Germany cleaned up the
inefficient, high
polluting factories and utilities it inherited in reintegrating
with former
communist East Germany, Britain converted its utilities to North
Sea natural
gas, and European population generally stagnated.
Last year, though, emissions crept up 0.3%, with Britain, which
submitted
Kyoto to Parliament for ratification in March, seeing its
emissions rise by
1.2%.
The point is that the easy cuts - those that sold the politicians
in Europe
on Kyoto in the first place - appear to be over. The next round
of cuts will
come at the expense of economic growth and employment.
A study by the DRI-WEFA for the American Council of Capital
Formation (ACCF)
presented at a roundtable in Brussels on April 25 - before the
new EU
numbers on emissions were delivered - provided an eye-opener
about that
reality for many political leaders there.
The report estimates that Germany, for example, will see home
heating oil
prices rise 14%, gasoline and diesel prices rise 14% and 20%
respectively,
and natural gas prices for industry rise by 40% by 2010 to meet
its Kyoto
target. Bottom line: GDP lower by 5.2% and unemployment up 1.8
million from
what it otherwise would be. In a nation, suffering 10%
unemployment, that
can hardly be heartening news.
Britain faces a 4% GDP loss from the baseline, as industry faces
a whopping
117% increase in natural gas costs. Job loss during the 2008-12
implementation phase of Kyoto would amount to 1 million annually.
Spain, which has seen its emissions increase 34% since 1990,
faces similar
difficulties bringing them down to merely 15% above 1990 levels,
as the EU
has ordered. The 5% loss in GDP will cost 4 million Spaniards
employment by
2012.
Some environmental groups dispute such findings. But the fact is
that most
nations that signed onto the Kyoto protocol never have done a
close
examination of the issue. After finally doing so this year,
Canada put off a
decision on ratifying Kyoto from August until later this year. It
wants to
renegotiate the Kyoto deal with Europe to permit allowances for
such things
as natural gas sales to the United States as a contribution to
emissions
reductions for itself.
You can make a bet that similar deals will start to be offered
once Kyoto
strictures begin to pinch economies, if politicians let it get
that far.
Many European business leaders don't think that their bureaucrats
will
actually go ahead with putting such an enormous drag on their
economies.
Unlike the United States, where passage of Kyoto would create an
inflexible
mandate for bureaucrats to enforce and private groups rights to
sue,
Europe's bureaucratic machinery bows to the will of the
parliamentary winds.
As economist Margo Thorning of ACCF has noted, they have the
flexibility to
let businesses off the hook if they don't live up to the goals.
That is probably why politicians there can sound so alarmed about
global
warming, because they know they can back away before it hurts too
much. That
also may explain why they embraced draconian to global warming
solutions
before looking carefully at the costs and benefits.
Environmentalists have demonstrated that they don't care much
about the
costs of their programs. One of the reasons that former
Greenpeace member
Bjorn Lomborg, author of "The Skeptical
Environmentalist," has drawn such
ire from environmental advocates is that he constantly raises
questions
about costs. Raising costs requires scientists and
environmentalists who
fear global warming to justify their positions. And who likes to
do that?
The world's politicians, though, and their constituents may come
to regret
that they didn't study the costs earlier, as was done here. If
they back
away from their rhetoric, they'll deservedly be labeled
hypocrites; if they
push ahead to the point of scuttling their economies, they'll be
fools. You
got to check the angles.
© 2002 Tech Central Station
============
(5) SOLAR DELUSIONS
>From Tech Central Station, 21 May 2002
http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051-450&CID=1051-052102A
By Sallie Baliunas 05/21/2002
Editor's note: This article is the second in a series.
Solar power proponents tout sunlight as an energy source that is
abundant,
free of noxious pollutants and carbon dioxide emission. They
claim that if
only sunlight were harnessed, plenty of clean, inexpensive and
abundant
energy would be available to improve the human condition while
preventing
environmental degradation.
When asked why the fantastical promise of solar power over the
last several
decades has not led to very much of it -- less than 0.1% of total
energy
supplied in the United States -- Ralph Nader in an interview
could only
explain, "Because Exxon doesn't own the sun."
Nader and I agree on one implication of his statement: capitalism
works.
Beyond that, Nader ignores some down-to-earth realities about
converting the
sun's energy for human use.
Sunny Promises
People want electricity when they want it. Electricity cannot be
stored; it
must be generated and delivered as needed. Flicking
"on" a light switch
instructs the local power distribution system to locate and
deliver
electricity that courses from power plants through a grid of
miles of wires
to light the bulb in a fraction of a second. In the case of power
from
fossil fuels -- which at present supply about 70% of the U.S.'s
electricity
needs -- those fuels are burned to generate the electricity at
nearly the
moment the switch is flicked. No ready power generation; no
light.
Can't sunlight do that job just as well?
As we learned in the last column, energy can be neither created
nor
destroyed, only transformed. To get electricity from sunlight,
humans must
do a lot of work to transform and deliver electricity to their
homes and
businesses. That work is a major barrier in cost-effectiveness of
solar
electricity compared to the current price of conventional sources
of
electricity.
Taking In The Rays
How do we transform sunlight? This episode focuses on fixed
photovoltaic
cells, which transform sunlight for local use. (Another way to
transform
sunlight is to concentrate and store its heat so it can create
electricity
through a generator -- solar thermal power. And hydroelectric and
wind power
owe their power to the sun. Those energy sources will be covered
in another
installment.)
Photovoltaic cells are remarkable semiconductor devices,
producing an
electrical current when sunlight strikes them. For example, my
decades-old
calculator works when light from the sun or a lamp shines on its
blocky gray
solar cell.
Most cells are manufactured from silicon and can convert up to
about 20% of
the sunlight illuminating them to electrical energy. The more
expensive the
cell, the more electricity it will yield. Even higher
efficiencies may be
possible with more exotic and expensive alloys employed as
semiconductors,
e.g., indium gallium arsenide nitride.
Highly efficient photovoltaic cells are excellent for space
application,
where a smaller size and lighter weight is favored over higher
cost. But
even in space, where sunlight is undimmed by clouds and
atmosphere, the real
estate required for useful applications of solar arrays is
enormous.
To illustrate, consider the panels of ganged-together solar cells
for
operating the International Space Station that are, according to
NASA, the
largest electricity-generating arrays in space. They cover eight
wings
spanning more 32,000 square feet -- nearly three quarters of an
acre. Even
so, the more than 250,000 solar cells deliver a theoretical peak
power of
only 246 kilowatts - in the sunlit portion of the 90-minute
orbit.
The director of NASA solar system space exploration says of
planet-exploring
satellites, "We currently operate with a light bulb's worth
of power on
board," which can limit science experiments. For spacecraft
in deep space,
faint sunlight means that solar panels are prohibitive in terms
of size and
weight. Expectations are for nuclear power systems aboard
spacecraft to
provide the kilowatts for improved science in deep space
exploration.
The limitation of photovoltaics in space is mirrored on Earth
with even
greater trade-offs. Even the least expensive panels are
relatively quite
expensive. According to the Federal Energy Management Program,
photovoltaic
solar systems average about 25 to 50 cents per kilowatt-hour at
remote
locations, over a system lifetime of 20 years. The national
average of
conventional power delivered from the grid costs 4 to 8 cents per
kilowatt-hour. More power can be had when the panels track the
sun, rather
than being fixed. The ability to track the sun adds to capital
and upkeep
costs. For now, less efficient and fixed systems will be favored,
but they
require more square footage for light collection.
At Home with Solar Arrays
Here's a practical example showing the impracticality of
operating a
fixed-panel system in New England.
A home clothes dryer uses about 5,000 watts (5 kW) of energy and
takes about
one hour to dry one batch of laundry. Now, my New England
neighbors might
save resources (money, most importantly) by hanging laundry
outdoors. The
downside is New England's weather: one must have a back-up plan
in case of,
e.g., freezing temperatures, blizzards or rain. An alternative
would be to
use the waste heat from a home furnace to dry clothing hung near
the
furnace.
The inconvenience is unappealing to many people. Could
photovoltaics run the
clothes dryer? Practically speaking, no, because sunlight shines
feebly and
intermittently in New England.
Accounting for both day and night, seasons throughout a year, and
incidence
of clear weather, a typical New England yard receives about 15
Watts of
sunlight per square foot. There is no changing that -- it is the
flux from
sunshine that one can expect, on average, in New England.
So to run just the clothes dryer off sunshine would take about of
3,300
square feet of cells if the system delivers electricity at a
good, 10%
efficiency. True, the times of peak sunlight could deliver enough
electricity to operate the dryer with less area of solar cells,
but then the
inconvenience of planning to work only during peak power - as in
drying
clothes in the air - returns.
In short, the diluteness and intermittency of sunlight means that
solar
collecting devices require land area, storage devices and back-up
sources of
electricity. On-demand electricity is convenient, and solar
panels alone
cannot provide it.
To operate more electrical appliances at the same time -- like
the furnace,
hot water heater, air conditioner, lights or computer -- would
require ever
more thousands of feet of panels. At night, nothing would run,
unless there
were significant energy storage capabilities. And what about
those majestic
cedar, sugar maple, ash, hickory, alder, beech, white pine, oak
and giant
sequoia trees? To keep shadows at bay during the day, those tall
trees that
sequester carbon and provide woodland habitat for animals from
hawks to
fishers would have to be chopped down so they do not block
sunlight falling
on thousands of square feet of panels.
The expanse of panels - much larger than the area of the typical
home's
south-facing roof - would need the support of sturdy steel and
concrete
structures to survive outdoor hazards. New England experiences
hurricanes
with winds over 100 miles per hour, tornadoes (a July 9, 1953,
twister
killed 90 people in Worcester, Mass., within one minute), heavy
snowfalls of
three to five feet, hailstorms and, although on very rare
occasions,
earthquakes (a magnitude 6 shock struck Cape Ann in 1755 and 6.5
in central
New Hampshire in 1638). The panels also will need to be kept
clean with
periodic washing. Other drawbacks: in hot weather, the panels are
less
efficient, and as they age, their efficiency declines.
Still, couldn't solar panels offset some electrical use from
other sources,
so that, for example, less coal would be used to generate
electricity, and
wouldn't that be better for the environment?
Solar arrays may be economically worthwhile at isolated, sunny
sites, or for
small demand at peak sunlight times, far from the electrical
grid. But on
the electrical grid, solar arrays are not yet cost-attractive.
The capital
cost of installed panels (on a roof) is about $10 per watt --
$30,000 for
3kW, still not enough to run the clothes dryer. Conventional
electricity
from the grid is available at costs of roughly one-fifth to
one-tenth that
of the solar panel power, so the homeowner won't recover the
capital costs
even in the sunniest climates over a system's 20-year lifetime of
collecting
"free sunlight."
Thus small solar panel systems aren't likely to draw a lot of
customers to
reduce the need for non-renewable sources like coal. As for
larger systems
that might provide economies of scale to reduce costs, they have
a major
cost in the land needed for arrays. The problems homeowners face
with small
arrays compound when one looks at a hypothetical system that
might serve
communities.
Consider solar energy to serve Pennsylvania's 12 million people.
How much
land would be needed for solar panels at current energy usage,
assuming the
panels deliver 10% of the incident sunlight as electricity,
averaged around
the year, day and night? The answer: about 1,100 square miles
snuggled
together in one massive ecosystem-robbing swath, consuming a land
area equal
to a third of Vermont - all of it on land that is clear cut and
of necessity
kept bald.
That 1,100 square miles doesn't include the land needed to
accommodate more
panels to make up transmission losses, for service roads, for
buildings and
high power transmission lines, and for the inevitable storage
devices when
the sun sets.
The footprint of a massive "clean" photovoltaic
facility serving any large
community's energy needs would raise serious environmental issues
all its
own. That is one reason that even as photovoltaics may have a
small niche
market in rural areas distant from existing electricity lines,
they for now
appear incapable of delivering the power for a 21st century
nation.
Next: Solar Towers
So, fixed solar arrays appear to be too environmentally costly to
replace a
typical 1,000-megawatt utility plant. The cost of photovoltaic
cells may
drop and their efficiency increase, but the sun is too feeble to
make a
substantial increase in capacity, without the technological
breakthrough of
inexpensive storage devices.
Could solar thermal towers that concentrate and store the
sunlight, be less
costly? The answer, again, is, "No," as we shall see in
the next
installment.
Copyright 2002, Tech Central Station
=============
(6) BAD SCIENCE NEVER DIES
>From Tech Central Station, 20 May 2002
http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051-450&CID=1051-052002A
By Howard Fienberg 05/20/2002
Splashy science news reports draw eyeballs and move policy, but
sometimes
the scientific heart of the news comes up short. Worse, it can be
dead
wrong. So what happens in the news when a study is found to be
faulty or
false and ends up being retracted or thrown out?
Not much, usually. Science news revolves around news -- new
studies,
discoveries and achievements. The discovery that previous
research has been
dis-proven or shown to be worth less than the paper it was
printed on just
does not register as news to most journalists, no matter how said
research
was originally hyped to the public.
This is understandable. After all, journalists often work for
publications
that don't worry much about correcting the public record. Most
newspapers
and magazines print correction columns, but they can be hard to
find. Few
publications admit in big type that they were wrong.
Of course, when the media make a mistake, it usually is not earth
shattering. By contrast, scientific errors can spread and leave
even more
bad science in their wake.
A study by Dr. John M. Budd et al. in the Journal of the American
Medical
Association (Jul. 15, 1998) examined 235 scientific journal
articles that
had been formally retracted due to error, misconduct, failure to
replicate
results, or other reasons. The researchers reported that,
"Retracted
articles continue to be cited as valid work in the biomedical
literature
after publication of the retraction."
Budd and his colleagues acknowledged that there is sometimes a
significant
time lag (an average of 28 months) between publication and
retraction. But
they found that the flawed articles were cited in the scientific
literature
an astonishing 2,034 times after they had been retracted. The
vast majority
of these post-retraction citations treated the work as still
valid, making
no reference to the retraction.
At a certain level, these studies have become urban myths.
Despite no longer
possessing scientific authority, their repeated publication has
let them
take on a life of their own -- regardless of any grounding in
truth. Such
scientific myths are worse than simple scare stories about kidney
stealing
or the influence of the full moon, because future researchers
unwittingly
depend upon their (invalidated) analyses.
For example, take the finding back in November that genetically
modified
corn had infiltrated regular strains in Mexico and was scrambling
DNA chains
(see Mexican Jumping Genes, Mar. 18). Scientists were suspicious
of the
study's claims from the start, but the examination of the
research took
time. Nature, the journal that had published the study, then
spent time
reviewing and considering the arguments of the critics as well as
the
counter-claims of the original authors. When Nature finally
printed letters
in April from two teams of scientists pointing out the extensive
deficiencies in the research, the journal all but retracted the
original
article, admitting that "the evidence available is not
sufficient to justify
the publication of the original paper."
However, when the media responded to this news, they concentrated
on
political aspects, not the important scientific ones. The
Washington Post
reported that one of the authors of the original article
"believed the
effort to undermine" the study "was the work of
biotechnology advocates,
some of whom had personal reasons for attacking him." Rather
than laying out
the science and the criticism, the Post reduced the matter to a
'he said,
she said' narrative, concentrating on personal and political
motives rather
than the merits of the research. This kind of narrative may
follow the
dictates of allegedly objective journalism, but it doesn't
explain very
much.
Further in the political vein, Guardian writer George Monbiot
(May 14)
dedicated a lengthy article to investigating the supposed public
relations
campaign against the article, a campaign "so severe"
that it "persuaded" the
journal to retract it (never mind the methodological problems in
the
article, which Monbiot called "hardly unprecedented in a
scientific
journal").
And, as if to demonstrate the conclusions of JAMA's 1998 study of
retractions, the Washington Times (Apr. 30) ran a center-page
spread on the
Mexican corn infiltration, along with photos from an anti-GM crop
demonstration outside the Mexican consulate in San Francisco and
a photo of
one of the original articles. While the Times did admit, deep
inside the
article, that the journal might have erred in publishing the
study "because
of a technical issue," understatement was not the biggest
problem. In
continuing to accept the retracted Nature article as gospel, the
newspaper
was simply following in the well-worn footsteps of news coverage
earlier
that month. When that media coverage reduced a scientific
retraction into
just another installment of political controversy, they reduced
the need of
other journalists to worry about the scientific part of the
problem.
Since even scientists must rely on the news media for much of
their science
news (an endless array of journals defy any sane person to keep
track of
them all), they might miss the Nature retraction, too. It won't
be long
before other journal articles cite the (retracted) study.
When initial research becomes received wisdom and subsequent
criticism and
retractions fail to enter the public consciousness, journalism
fails in its
duty to both science and the public. As long as science is news,
journalists
should learn to take the mundane footnote with the exciting
headline.
© 2002 Tech Central Station
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