PLEASE NOTE:
*
CCNet, 74/2000 - 10 July 2000
-------------------------------
"Project Icarus was only a study
proposal. [...] There have been
several unofficial asteroid defense
proposals made by various
aerospace experts in the ensuing 33
years, including some
utilizing the now-defunct Soviet Energia
booster. None of them
were as carefully planned as the Icarus
project. Today the issue
of asteroid defense still has a high
"giggle factor" associated
with it — nobody in power in the
American government takes the
threat seriously.”
-- Dwayne A. Day
"The fact is that everyone is free
to use the Torino Scale
according to their own interpretation.
Attempts to stifle
scientific criticism of its flaws or to
gag its critics are not
only unjustified but simply have no
place in the world of
scientific debate and research."
-- Benny J.
Peiser
(1) VERY BIG BOMBS & ROCKETS: ARMAGEDDON FOR REAL
Larry Klaes <lklaes@bbn.com>
(2) BAD NEWS FOR PLANETARY DEFENSE: MISSILE TEST FAILS TO
INTERCEPT WARHEAD. LUCKILY, JUST A ROCKET, NOT
AN ASTEROID!
YAHOO! News, 9 July 2000
(3) SOME COMETS LIKE IT HOT
NASA Science News <science.news@msfc.nasa.gov>
(4) SPACE PROTECTION OF THE EARTH 2000
Ron Baalke <baalke@jpl.nasa.gov>
(5) NEAR-EARTH ASTEROID SAMPLE RETURN WORKSHOP
Ron Baalke <baalke@jpl.nasa.gov>
(6) IMPACTS & EXTINCTIONS
Michael Paine <mpaine@tpgi.com.au>
(7) TORINO SCALE - A REASSESSMENT
Jonathan Tate <fr77@dial.pipex.com>
(8) ATTEMPTS TO SILENCE TORINO SCALE CRITICS ARE FUTILE
Benny J Peiser <b.j.peiser@livjm.ac.uk>
=============
(1) VERY BIG BOMBS & ROCKETS: ARMAGEDDON FOR REAL
From Larry Klaes <lklaes@bbn.com>
From Florida Today, 4 July 2000
http://www.flatoday.com/space/explore/special/icarus.htm
Very big bombs and rockets: Armageddon for real
By Dwayne A. Day
A SPACE ONLINE special report
VIENNA, Va. - In recent years, Hollywood has thrilled audiences
with
asteroid movies. In the absurd 1998 hit Armageddon, oil driller
Bruce
Willis led a valiant effort to stop a killer chunk of planetary
matter from
sending humanity the way of the dinosaurs.
But over thirty years ago, a group of engineers-in-training at
the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology designed a far more
realistic
defense against a doomsday rock. Their plan would have involved a
half
dozen Saturn 5 rockets carrying some really big bombs.
Every nineteen years the large asteroid Icarus swings by planet
Earth,
often coming within four million miles of the planet - mere
spitting
distance in astronomical terms. Icarus last passed by Earth in
1997.
Before that, its previous approach was in June 1968.
In early 1967, MIT professor Paul Sandorff gave his class of
graduate
students a task: suppose that instead of passing harmlessly by,
Icarus
was instead going to hit the Earth. The nearly mile-wide chunk of
rock
would hit the planet with the force of 500,000 megatons - far
larger
than any major earthquake or volcanic eruption. Over 33,000 times
the
size of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. At a minimum, it would
kill
millions, flattening buildings and trees for a radius of hundreds
of
miles, and/or causing huge tidal waves that would wipe out
coastal
cities along thousands of miles of coastline. It could even lead
to a
global winter that could last years. Sandorff posed a simple
challenge:
"You have fifteen months. How do you stop Icarus?"
MIT was then deeply involved in the Apollo program. The guidance
system
for the Apollo spacecraft was developed there and the
country’s
foremost experts in aviation and space walked the school’s
halls.
Sandorff’s proposal was intended to teach his students how
to improvise
under pressure. Intense pressure.
The class immediately split up into several working groups based
upon
their areas of expertise: orbits and trajectories, boosters and
propulsion, spacecraft, guidance and control, communications,
economics
and management, and nuclear payloads. They began evaluating the
different options for defeating the killer rock.
Could they launch a big bomb to the asteroid and blow it to
pieces?
Quick calculations showed that pulverizing a rock the size of
Icarus
would require a 1,000 megaton bomb. No nuclear weapon even
remotely
that big had ever been theorized, let alone designed or built.
There
was no way it could be done in the short time available. Using a
bunch
of smaller bombs was also not possible because they would all
have to
be detonated at exactly the same time. Otherwise, one bomb would
vaporize the others before they detonated.
The most desirable option would be to rendezvous with Icarus when
it
reached aphelion - the slowest point in its orbit - in November
1967.
At that point it would be easiest to rendezvous with the
slow-moving
asteroid and easiest to exert force to change its orbit. But such
a
mission would have had to be launched immediately, in spring
1967, and
so it was out of the question. The group quickly determined that
no
rockets could conceivably be readied before 1968 and this greatly
constrained their options. A slow rendezvous, or even a soft
landing,
was therefore totally out of the question: Icarus would be moving
too
fast by 1968 for a spacecraft to reach it and then reverse
direction
for a rendezvous.
Fast Intercept
The only option was a fast intercept - fly out to Icarus and
detonate a
bomb near the surface to change its course.
The best way to get the most payload to Icarus was to launch two
modified Saturn 5 rockets into orbit. These would rendezvous with
an
Apollo 'space tug' launched atop a Titan 3 rocket. The space tug
would
connect up the modified S-4B third stages from the Saturns. They
would
then be used to push a relatively large spacecraft out to Icarus
where
it would detonate a large nuclear weapon.
But there were many problems with this proposal. The Saturn S-4B
third
stages were not designed to carry fuel in orbit for more than six
hours
and would require extensive modification. A spacecraft would also
have
to be designed from scratch and built in under a year. Most
importantly, the on-orbit operations required to link up the
large
craft were extensive and unproven. There would be no way to
practice.
This plan was rejected.
What the group decided to do was to take six Saturn 5 rockets
then in
production, and with only minimal modifications to their
payloads, use
them to carry smaller bombs to Icarus. The first launch would
have to
take place by April 1968, only a year away, and five more
launches
would have to follow at two-week increments.
The actual Icarus spacecraft would have consisted of an Apollo
Service
Module (SM) with a five-foot cylindrical extension known as the
Payload
Module (PM) at the top. Instead of a Command Module, the top of
the
stack would be a simple aluminum cone containing a few necessary
systems. Although the Apollo Command Module and its associated
guidance
and control systems would have been useful, its weight was
prohibitive
and unnecessary. Weight had to be kept to a minimum in order to
enable
the rocket to carry the biggest possible bomb.
The Bomb
The Payload Module would have carried a 100 megaton bomb shaped
as a
cylinder roughly three feet in diameter and mounted horizontally
along
the diameter of the spacecraft. The bomb would weigh 40,000
pounds. One
side of the PM would sport a phased array radar antenna for
tracking
and rendezvous with the Icarus asteroid.
The plan would have used an essentially unmodified Saturn 5
rocket. At
the time, the first Saturn 5 test was not scheduled until
November 1967
and the planners did not know if it would work. The only real
difference with the Icarus Saturn 5 was the modified adapter
shroud at
the top of the S-4B third stage. On a standard Apollo mission to
the
moon these panels normally would have enclosed the Lunar Module,
with
the Service Module and Command Module mounted on top. But, by
modifying
them and using them to enclose the Service Module and its
attached
Payload Module, the designers were able to improve the
aerodynamics of
the rocket, and more importantly, eliminate aerodynamic loads and
heating on the radar antenna. In profile, the stack would have
looked
much like the Skylab launch vehicle lofted by the Saturn 5 in
1974,
although with minor differences.
The 100 megaton bomb would have been a challenge. At the time,
the
largest weapon ever developed for the American nuclear arsenal
was a
25 megaton bomb. The Soviets had detonated a 58 megaton bomb
earlier in
the decade which could have easily been developed into a 100
megaton
weapon. However, although the Soviets have not (and still have
not)
released the weight of this bomb - they were never as good at
miniaturizing their bombs as the United States. It is likely that
their
100 megaton bomb would have weighed far more than the 40,000
pound
weight limit for Icarus. The United States would have had to
build its
own bomb to save the planet.
The Rockets
The Icarus plan required a total of nine Saturn 5 rockets. Three
were
test flights and the remaining six were interceptors. At the
time, NASA
planned on having only six Saturn V’s available by April
1968, so the
production schedule would have to be dramatically increased. In
addition, another launch pad would have to be built at Cape
Kennedy.
Launch Complex 39-C would have to be built, north of the two
existing
pads, in order to enable the high flight rate needed for the
Saturn
launches, all of which had to get off the ground in six weeks.
In addition to the nine Saturn 5s, the Icarus plan called for
five
Atlas Agena rockets carrying modified versions of the Mariner II
deep
space probe. Known as the Intercept Monitoring Satellite (IMS),
these
probes would be used to observe the actual detonation of the
nuclear
bombs when they reached the asteroid. Very little was known about
how
nuclear weapons would actually behave in space, let alone how the
blast
would affect an asteroid, and so the IMS was considered vital to
the
mission.
Interceptor One
In late February 1968, the first IMS spacecraft would lift off
atop its
Atlas Agena booster. It would linger in Earth orbit only a short
time
before being sent on its way to rendezvous with Icarus. A little
over a
month later, Interceptor One would thunder aloft on seven and a
half
million pounds of thrust. After a coast of one orbit or less, the
S-4B
stage would fire, boosting the Icarus spacecraft out of earth
orbit and
toward the asteroid. Soon after, the adapter shroud panels would
peel
back like the petals of a flower and the Icarus spacecraft with
its 100
megaton bomb would separate. Its Service Propulsion System engine
would
fire, adding more velocity to the spacecraft.
After a coast of approximately 60 days, with several course
corrections
along the way, an optical sensor aboard the spacecraft would
acquire
Icarus only three hours before rendezvous. The spacecraft then
entered
the 'terminal phase.' Four minutes before rendezvous the radar
system
would begin to supply range information for making final
correction
maneuvers. At five seconds before impact, a fuzing radar would
acquire
the asteroid and arm the bomb. If all went as planned, detonation
would
occur within 100 feet of the surface of Icarus along the sunlit
edge.
The resulting explosion would either fragment or deflect the
killer
rock off its collision course.
The IMS spacecraft would monitor the detonation with its sensors,
relaying the data back to earth so that the mission planners
could
refine their calculations. At the time that Interceptor One would
reach
Icarus, Interceptor Two would be right behind it by only a couple
of
weeks. And several more would be following right on Interceptor
Two’s
heels. Most of these would be accompanied by an IMS flight. But
there
was only time enough to launch five IMS flights.
The planners proposed six bombs for the mission. But they faced
huge
unknowns. The biggest problem was that nobody knew exactly what
asteroids in general, and Icarus in particular, were made of. Was
Icarus dense or light? Exactly how big was it? How was it shaped?
Furthermore, nobody was sure how a nuclear bomb would act in
space or
how it would affect Icarus. There was no way to get everything
right on
the first try and so several bombs would have to be detonated
before
planners even began to understand what they were doing. And if
one or
more of the bombs was a dud, or detonated too far from the
asteroid,
the mission controllers would have to improvise quickly as their
thin
stream of Interceptor spacecraft streaked heavenward to save the
planet.
All this time, Icarus would be heading toward earth.
Conclusion
Project Icarus was only a study proposal. It was never formally
adopted
or even evaluated by the United States government. There was no
independent evaluation of whether or not the proposal was even
feasible. There might be some hidden flaw to the plan that was
never
identified. The MIT group did brief a number of people in the
NASA on
the proposal, however, and several of the MIT grads later went to
work
for the space agency.
There have been several unofficial asteroid defense proposals
made by
various aerospace experts in the ensuing 33 years, including some
utilizing the now-defunct Soviet Energia booster. None of them
were as
carefully planned as the Icarus project. Today the issue of
asteroid
defense still has a high “giggle factor” associated
with it — nobody in
power in the American government takes the threat seriously.
But the Project Icarus model is probably worth dusting off and
trying
again either as an exercise for aerospace engineering students or
for a
government science and engineering advisory board. Although it
would
not be a valid contingency plan, at least it would help to
identify our
options in the event that something like this happened. If
humanity
suddenly realized that an asteroid was heading our way and we had
only
two years to respond, could we do something? Or would we simply
be
condemned to sit back and stare at the clock, waiting for the
brief
flash in the upper atmosphere signifying impending doom?
Dwayne A. Day is an independent space policy analyst living in
Vienna,
Virginia. He holds a Ph.D. from The George Washington University
and
has written numerous articles on civilian and military space
policy and
history. He was the primary editor for "Eye in the Sky: The
Story of the
CORONA Spy Satellites". He is a frequent contributor to
SPACE
ONLINE.
================
(2) BAD NEWS FOR PLANETARY DEFENSE: MISSILE TEST FAILS TO
INTERCEPT WARHEAD. LUCKILY, JUST A ROCKET, NOT AN ASTEROID!
From YAHOO! News, 9 July 2000
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20000709/ts/arms_usa_missiles_dc_2.html
U.S. Ponders Next Move on Missile Defense
By Charles Aldinger
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A U.S. attempt to intercept and destroy a
target
warhead in space failed on Saturday, leaving the Pentagon
wondering
what went wrong and the White House wondering whether to proceed
with
the controversial National Missile Defense (NMD) system.
"We did not intercept the warhead tonight. We are
disappointed," Air
Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the missile defense
effort,
told reporters early on Saturday after the weapon failed a $100
million
test to separate from its booster rocket and intercept the dummy
warhead over the Pacific Ocean.
FULL STORY at
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20000709/ts/arms_usa_missiles_dc_2.html
See also: National Missile Defense - DoD Post-Test News Briefing
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-00zzg.html
===============
(3) SOME COMETS LIKE IT HOT
From NASA Science News <science.news@msfc.nasa.gov>
NASA Science News for July 07, 2000
Amateur astronomers are discovering pieces of a giant comet that
broke
apart in antiquity as the fragments zoom perilously close to the
Sun.
July 7, 2000 -- In October 1965 comet Ikeya-Seki swooped past the
Sun
barely 450 thousand kilometers above our star's bubbling, fiery
surface. Gas and dust exploded away from the comet's core as
fierce
solar radiation vaporized the icy nucleus. Most comets wouldn't
survive
passing as close to the Sun as the Moon is to the Earth, but
Ikeya-Seki
literally came through with flying colors. When the comet emerged
from perihelion (closest approach to the Sun) it was so bright
that
observers on the street with very clear skies could see it during
broad
daylight if the Sun was hidden behind a house or even an
outstretched
hand.
"In Japan (where observers spied the comet 1/2 degree from
the Sun)
it was described as 10 times brighter than the Full Moon,"
recounted
Brian Marsden of the Harvard Center for Astrophysics in the
December
1965 issue of Sky & Telescope. "At Kitt Peak National
Observatory in
Arizona, Stephen Maran observed the comet with binoculars from
within
the shadow of a black disk erected to hide the Sun. '[It was] the
most
splendid thing I have ever seen,' he noted."
Ikeya-Seki, a.k.a. "The Great Comet of 1965", is a
member of the family
of comets called Kreutz sungrazers (after the nineteenth-century
German
astronomer who studied them in some detail). These ill-fated
visitors
to the inner solar system have been seen to pass less than 50,000
km
above the Sun's photosphere. Most never make it past perihelion
-- they
are completely obliterated. But the few that do, like Ikeya-Seki,
can
be very bright.
"There are 2 or 3 really bright ones like Ikeya-Seki every
century,"
says Brian Marsden. "Most of these sungrazers are fragments
from the
breakup of a giant comet at least 2000 years ago, perhaps the one
that
the Greek astronomer Ephorus saw in 372 BC. Ephorus reported that
the
comet split in two. This can be made to fit with my calculation
that
Ikeya-Seki and an even better Kreutz sungrazer observed in 1882
split
off from each other when their parent revisited the Sun around AD
1100.
Splits have occurred again and again, producing the sungrazer
family,
all still coming from the same direction."
The nucleus of Ikeya-Seki was probably some kilometers across.
Tinier
pieces of Ephorus's comet streak past the Sun every day.
Measuring
perhaps only ten meters in diameter, they brighten briefly as
they
approach the Sun and disappear forever when they vaporize above
the
photosphere. Most of the faint fragments must have escaped
detection
entirely.
Now, thanks to coronagraphs on board the orbiting ESA/NASA Solar
and
Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO), amateur and professional
astronomers
can easily monitor the sky around the Sun for the telltale
streaks of
faint sungrazers. All that's needed is a computer and a
connection to
the internet.
"In late1998 we put SOHO's realtime coronagraph movies
online so that
anyone with an internet connection could access the data"
says Doug
Biesecker, a solar physicist at the Goddard Space Flight Center
and
SOHO's champion comet hunter with 47 finds. "Over a three
year period
before that time we had found 58 comets near the Sun in SOHO
images.
Now the total is up to nearly 170. Amateur astronomers watching
coronagraph movies on the web are responsible for nearly all of
the new
finds this year. They're keeping me very busy!"
A coronagraph is a device that blocks the glare of the Sun so
that the
faint corona, as well as surrounding stars and planets, are
visible.
It's a sophisticated version of the black disk Stephen Maran used
to
see Ikeya-Seki in 1965. The SOHO spacecraft carries two
coronagraphs,
one with a 3-degree field of view (the "C2"
coronagraph) and another
with a 16-degree field of view (the "C3" coronagraph).
SOHO is located
at the L1 point 1.5 million kilometers from the Earth in the
direction
of the Sun. It enjoys an uninterrupted view of our star.
One of the most successful amateur comet hunters is Michael
Boschat.
He's credited (or shares credit) with a dozen discoveries since
March
2000.
"I use the C3 512 x 512 pixel images," explains
Boschat. "They appear
on the SOHO site every 30 minutes and I download them as soon as
they
do. After I have four images I begin to loop them using GIF
animation
software that can be found on the Internet. I usually loop them
at four
frames per second looking for an object that is moving towards
the Sun
in a steady manner. I also use a magnifying glass to watch the
possible
comet move. After I feel it is a comet I put my mouse arrow as
near as
possible to the object to get the X and Y coordinates then send
all that
information off via email to Douglas Biesecker at Goddard."
All of the comets identified in images from SOHO are called
"comet
SOHO" followed by a number denoting the order of discovery.
This
differs from the traditional convention of naming a comet after
the
person who finds it. The most recent confirmed sungrazer, as of
July 4,
2000, was comet SOHO-143. The International Astronomical Union's
official designation for SOHO-143 is C/1998 K15, because the
actual
images were obtained in 1998, with the K15 indicating that this
was the
fifteenth comet (of any description) found during the second half
of
May.
"It started in the early 1980s with the SOLWIND mission,
which also
carried a coronagraph," explains Biesecker. "SOLWIND
detected 6
sungrazers and they were all named after the satellite. The
tradition
continued for the Solar Maximum Mission (10 comets) and now for
SOHO
(143 confirmed comets and counting). It's reasonable because all
of the
comet finds have to be confirmed by mission scientists who are
familiar
with the hardware. Cosmic rays, noise in the detectors and other
factors can mimic comets and we have to carefully examine each
one. It's
really a team effort."
"In the early 1980s there were also the 'IRAS' comets, found
by the
Infrared Astronomical Satellite," added Marsden. "Most
of the comets
found nowadays from the ground--and far from the sun--are named
'LINEAR', acronym for the Lincoln Near Earth Asteroid Research
team,
which scans the sky intensely with a U.S. Air Force
telescope." (One of
these is about to become a naked eye object in late July, 2000.)
Biesecker says he hopes the recent spate of amateur discoveries
will
continue unabated.
"The amateur discoveries are important because they can help
us
understand the fragmentation history of Kreutz sungrazers by
monitoring
the numbers and brightness of the smallest ones that we can see
with
the SOHO coronagraphs. The amateurs are also finding a few
unrelated
'near-Sun' comets [this is not an official name] that pass within
10 to
20 solar radii of the Sun. This is an under-sampled population of
comets."
If you're interested in joining the hunt for sungrazing comets, a
good
place to start is the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory's
realtime
images web page where coronagraph data are posted every 30
minutes,
and sometimes even more frequently. Data from the satellite are
available to the general public at the same time as to the
scientific
community. If you think you've found something, first review the
basic
criteria for a discovery before forwarding the details to
scientists at
the Goddard Space Flight Center. Confirmed finds are posted daily
on
the "What's New" area of http://sungrazer.nascom.nasa.gov.
SOHO (the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory) is a mission of
international cooperation between NASA and the European Space
Agency.
It is managed by the Goddard Space Flight Center for the NASA HQ
office
of Space Science.
=========================
(4) SPACE PROTECTION OF THE EARTH 2000
From Ron Baalke <baalke@jpl.nasa.gov>
http://www.snezhinsk.ru/spe2000/
http://www.snezhinsk.ru/asteroids/
http://www.snezhinsk.ru/asteroids/eng/spe2000/
Space Protection of the Earth - 2000
Third International Conference
September 11-15, 2000, Evpatoriya, Crimea, Ukraine
First Announcement
Conference Dates and Location
Series of international conferences "Asteroid Hazard"
(Saint-Petersburg) and "Space Protection of the
Earth" (Snezhinsk,
former Chelyabinsk-70) were held in Russia in 90s. They were
devoted to
one of the most complicated problems facing by the mankind -
protection
of the Earth from the threat of its collision with asteroids and
comets. Distinguished scientists and specialists from many
countries of
the world including Russia, the U.S. and other contributed to the
conferences.
The vital urgency of the problem is emphased by scientific
information,
which has been accumulated about the role of the space collisions
in
the history of the Earth and mankind, and predictions of
destruction
effects. The interest to this problem has been growing year by
year
since new scientific data and technologies appear that could be
used to
prevent such catastrophe.
The next third Conference "Space Protection of the Earth -
2000"
(SPE-2000) will take place in Crimea in Evpatoriya city on
September
11-15, 2000. Crimea is not only a well-known Black Sea health
resort
but a place where astronomical (optical and radiolocation)
observations
of asteroids and comets are fulfilled as well as control of the
interplanetary space satellites studying the solar system
objects.
The Conference is organized by the Russian Federal Nuclear Center
(All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of the Technical
Physics)
(RFNC-VNIITF), Lavochkin Association (LA) and the Institute of
Technical Mechanics (ITM) of the National Academy of Sciences of
Ukraine and Ukrainian Space Agency, Scientific Technical
Foundation
"Space Shield" supported by Minatom RF, Russian
Aerospace Agency,
Ukrainian Space Agency and some other organizations.
Conference Goals
The objectives of the conference are to assess the state of
scientific
researches in the sphere of planetary protection from asteroids
and
comets; to workout recommendations for their further development;
to
wide contacts among specialists and to attract people's
attention to this problem. In addition, it is planned to consider
some
associated problems, for example, feasibility assessment of
utilizing
small celestial bodies in the interests of mankind and space
science
development.
Areas of Interest
1. Asteroid and comet hazard
Asteroid and comet encounters with the Earth and other celestial
bodies
(real events and their consequences, classification, modeling,
risk
assessment);
Existing technology of detection and observation of small
celestial
bodies (ground methods and means, space missions);
Results of studying asteroids and comets (characteristics, orbit,
engineering, physics and other models);
2. Scientific and technological aspects of creating the defense
devices
against hazardous celestial bodies
Conceptual basis for ensuring Earth defense as well as protection
of
other objects (problems, requirements, principles and design
schemes,
application scenarios, etc.);
Technologies for detection, support and research of the
near-Earth
objects (NEOs) (methods, means, design and interaction schemes,
potentialities of amateur astronomy, etc.);
Technologies of delivery means of influence to dangerous
celestial
bodies (rocket-space systems, ballistics, navigation, approaching
and
pointing dynamics, etc.);
Technologies of acting onto dangerous celestial bodies (methods,
safety, kinetic means, nuclear, etc.);
Information support and control (information acquisition and
processing, decision making, warning, control of the components
and
their interaction);
Work-out of the planetary defense system components (space
missions,
demonstration experiments, schemes, means, sensors, etc.);
Miscellaneous (integration, safety, economics, etc..);
3. Social aspects of planetary defense
Ecological, political, legislation and other problems;
International co-operation;
4. Prospects and problems of utilizing asteroid and comet
resources
Articles aimed to resolve some specific problems of Planetary
defence
system development will be of higher priority.
Co-chairman of the program committee
Vadim A. SIMONENKO - Deputy Scientific Director of RFNC-VNIITF
Konstantin G. SUKHANOV - Deputy Chief Designer of Lavochkin
Association
FOR CONFERENCE DETAILS see:
http://www.snezhinsk.ru/asteroids/eng/spe2000/
http://www.snezhinsk.ru/asteroids/
=============
(5) NEAR-EARTH ASTEROID SAMPLE RETURN WORKSHOP
From Ron Baalke <baalke@jpl.nasa.gov>
http://cass.jsc.nasa.gov/meetings/asteroid2000/
Near-Earth Asteroid Sample Return Workshop
December 11-13, 2000
Lunar and Planetary Institute
Houston, Texas
First Announcement
SPONSORS
University of Arkansas
Lunar and Planetary Institute
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
STEERING COMMITTEE
Derek Sears, Chair, University of Arkansas
Dan Britt, University of Tennessee
Don Brownlee, University of Washington
Andrew Cheng, Johns Hopkins University
Benton Clark, Lockheed Martin Astronautics
Leon Geffert, NASA Glenn Research Center
Steve Goreven, Honeybee Robotics
Marilyn Lindstrom, NASA Johnson Space Center
Carle Pieters, Brown University
Jeff Preble, SpaceWorks, Inc.
CONTACT INFORMATION
Scientific Program:
Derek Sears
Workshop Program Committee Chair
dsears@comp.uark.edu
Announcements and Logistics:
LeBecca Simmons
LPI Workshop Coordinator
simmons@lpi.usra.edu
It is widely recognized that comet,
asteroid, and meteorite
research is at a point in its history
where sample return from a
known geologic context is essential, and
several past workshops
have stressed the need for such
missions. Near-Earth asteroids
(NEAs) are also important as potential
Earth impactors, targets
for human exploration and development of
space (HEDS), and
resources for space stations and
colonies. Several developments in
the last year or so mean that it is now
technically feasible to
fly NEA sample return missions. The NEAR
Shoemaker mission
demonstrated the feasibility of orbiting
and performing complex
maneuvers near small asteroids. The Deep
Space 1 mission validated
solar electric propulsion and automatic
navigation. Most
important, the explosion in the rate at
which NEAs are being
discovered means that targets of diverse
spectral classification,
including some that might be extinct
comets, come within range of
a multiple NEA sample return mission.
The Japanese MUSES-C
mission, which will return samples from
asteroid ML 1989, is
scheduled for launch in 2002.
The meteorite, comet, and asteroid
research communities all
recognize the need for sample return
from asteroids. Asteroids
provide a unique opportunity to
investigate primitive solar system
materials, including presolar materials
and potentially biogenic
materials, and processes that occurred
in the early solar system
and subsequently. Both asteroid and
comet nucleus sample return
have been advocated in the NASA Space
Science Strategic Plan and
Roadmaps. A previous workshop was held
at Milipitas, California,
in 1989.
The purpose of this workshop is to bring
together people of highly
diverse backgrounds so they can identify
the scientific issues
best addressed by NEA sample return.
Discussion could include
recommendations on mission design that
would ensure the highest
scientific return. The workshop will
also explore the role of
asteroid sample return in HEDS, impact
mitigation, and resource
utilization.
The Near-Earth Asteroid Sample Return
Workshop will have four
goals: (1) to identify the major
scientific issues that can be
uniquely addressed by NEA sample return;
(2) to identify the
requirements and constraints this places
on the design of such
missions; (3) to explore the extent to
which such requirements and
constraints can be met by existing
technologies and identify any
necessary technology developments; and
(4) to consider the role of
NEA sample return missions in HEDS,
Earth impact mitigation, and
resource utilization.
These goals will be addressed in four
theme sessions: Session 1,
"The Scientific Case for Sample
Return," will discuss the progress
in asteroid, comet, and meteorite
research possible through the
analysis of NEA samples. Session 2,
"Spacecraft Maneuvers in the
Vicinity of Small asteroids," will
concern the navigation and
control requirements of sampling from
the surface of small
asteroids. Session 3, "Sample
Collection Devices, Sample
Containment, and Planetary Protection
Issues," will deal with
options for collecting samples and
storing them for return to
Earth. Discussion may address issues of
sampling procedures
without contaminating the asteroid,
without contaminating the
samples during sampling, and returning
the samples to Earth
without cross contamination. Session 4,
"Implications for
Near-Earth Asteroid Sample Return for
Resource Utilization, Impact
Hazard Mitigation, and Human Exploration
and Development of
Space," will discuss possible wider
implications of sample return
to life on Earth and our exploration of
space. Each session will
consist of invited reviews, contributed
talks, and poster
presentations. Summary sessions will be
the basis for a short
report and recommendations.
Contributions to Session 1 ("The
Scientific Case for Sample
Return") are solicited from
asteroid, comet, and meteorite
specialists interested in the
compositional and physical
properties of small planetary bodies and
their histories. Of
special interest are contributions
discussing the asteroids and
comets as potential meteorite parent
bodies, and the important
scientific issues best addressed by
sample return.
Contributions to Session 2
("Spacecraft Maneuvers in the Vicinity
of Small Asteroids") are solicited
from experts in orbital
dynamics and spacecraft control and
navigation. Orbiting small
irregular-shaped asteroids presents
novel challenges, but many
advances have been made in recent years.
Contributions to Session 3 ("Sample
Collection Devices, Sample
Containment, and Planetary Protection
Issues") are invited from
industrial and academic specialists with
expertise in developing
methods for collecting representative
samples and storing them for
return to Earth. Contributions are also
invited from engineers and
exobiologists who are experts in
planetary protection, sample
cross contamination, and contamination
of the samples during
collection and storage.
Contributions to Session 4
("Implications for Near-Earth Asteroid
Sample Return for Resource Utilization,
Impact Hazard Mitigation,
and Human Exploration and Development of
Space") are invited from
the community interested in HEDS, Earth
impactors, and NEAs as a
natural resources. Emphasis should be on
the role of sample return
missions in furthering the objectives of
these areas of research.
FURTHER INFORMATION
Further details regarding abstract
submission, the program, and
logistics will be included in the second
and final announcements.
Indication of interest forms are due to
LPI by July 30, 2000. You
MUST return either the downloadable
Indication of Interest form
(PDF format) or complete the electronic
Indication of Interest
form in order to receive future
announcements.
------------------------------------------------------------------
SCHEDULE
July 30, 2000 Indication of Interest
forms due
at LPI
August 11, 2000 Second announcement mailed
September 25, HARD-COPY abstract
submission
2000
deadline
October 2, 2000 ELECTRONIC abstract submission
deadline
November 1, 2000 Final announcement mailed
November 10,
2000
Preregistration deadline
December 11-13 Near-Earth Asteroid Sample
2000
Return Workshop
=============================
* LETTERS TO THE MODERATOR *
=============================
(6) IMPACTS & EXTINCTIONS
From Michael Paine < mpaine@tpgi.com.au
>
Dear Benny,
Duncan Steel's comments about confusion over the consequences of
impacts (CCNet, 29 June 2000) are very relevant to my (stalled)
investigations of the Indo-China impact 800,000 years ago. The
signs
are that the impactor was between 2 and 5km in diameter and
therefore
would have caused global climate disruption and severe conditions
for
Homo Erectus. There seems, however, to be no evidence of major
extinctions at the time - and Homo Erectus survived the event of
course. I am sure however, that such an impact today would cause
global
crop failures and starvation and, likely, a collapse of
civilisation
(it would take far less to cause a collapse of the fragile global
economy). There would also be severe effects from the complete
loss of
the ozone layer for months or possibly years. I have summarized
my
findings and the possible effects of large impacts at
http://www1.tpgi.com.au/users/tps-seti/climate.htm
The point is that these impacts take place on timescales of
hundreds of
thousands of years - not the tens of millions of years associated
with
'extinction level events'.
regards
Michael Paine
================
(7) TORINO SCALE - A REASSESSMENT
From Jonathan Tate < fr77@dial.pipex.com
>
Benny,
The piece below is for the CCNet, if you deem it
appropriate. It is
already doing the rounds between the members of the Board of
Directors
of the SGF, and is bound to cause a bit of a stir - though not
too much
I hope.
Jay
The Torino Scale Alternative - A Reassessment.
or "The Perfect is the Enemy of the Good"
By J.R. Tate
Spaceguard UK
Since its introduction more than a year ago at the Torino IMPACT
symposium, the fortunes of the Torino Scale have followed
something of
a twin track. Thanks to a blizzard of NASA publicity the Torino
Scale
is well on the way to becoming the standard reference for popular
publications and the media for assessing the impact hazard. In
the
meantime, within the professional community the scale has become
the
centre of significant controversy and discussion. There has been
a
substantial amount of "the Torino Scale is useless* /
inaccurate* /
misleading*" (*delete where inapplicable) chat, but
surprisingly no
realistic alternatives have been produced. This can only be
because of
one of two reasons:
a. There isn't one.
b. The professional community doesn't care about explaining its
findings to the public.
I assume that the former is the case.
For reasons that we need not dwell upon (mea culpa - in part),
the
Torino Scale has been little used outside the United States,
despite
the fact that there have been at least two suitable occasions
since its
inception. Discussions with the media have inevitably involved
more
detailed descriptions than provided by the Scale, but have tended
to be
inconsistent and consequently confusing.
There is no doubt that the Torino Scale can be revised or
improved.
However, there has been only one serious suggestion to date,
despite
the number of individuals criticising the scale. Some of you may
have
seen, and possibly even have read the alternative to the Torino
Scale
that I have been working on. My proposal was, in effect, a
modified
Torino Scale, with the addition of the time to impact factor. It
is now
clear that the Torino Scale is to be used with such a rider.
There is obviously no ideal translation of this multidimensional
problem into a simple one (or two) dimensional system. However,
in the
current debate we have reached a clear point of diminishing
return when
the public perception is that we (the NEO community) is divided
and
cannot make up its mind. We could continually tweak and change
any
system, but all that would achieve would be frustration and
confusion
from the public, politicians and the media. We are already faced
by a
very unsatisfactory public image ("Astronomers change their
minds -
again - and say asteroid won't hit the Earth after all") and
constantly
changing our communication system - at least in the near term -
will
only make the situation worse.
There is no doubt in my mind that it is in the best interest of
the NEO
community and of the society that we purport to serve, that we
communicate information about potential threats in a common and
clear
language. Many of us have been vocal in our objections to the
Torino
Scale, but no one has come up with a better solution. So,
imperfect as
it is, we should us it with confidence and without
complaint. Anything
else would be at best a disservice to public and at worst,
irresponsible in the extreme.
The Torino Scale has been well publicised, and provides the basis
for
the NEO community to demonstrate a sense of unity with simple,
clear,
and efficient communications to the media, public and emergency
services. Given the Torino Scale's professional publication and
world-wide media exposure I believe that we should now accept the
"Torino Scale" as it stands, on the understanding that
significant
changes and/or improvements will be thoroughly discussed and
agreed in
the appropriate forum prior to publication. This
stipulation is in no
way intended to stifle proposals or to "protect" the
Torino Scale, but
is solely to avoid confusion, turmoil and apparent incompetence
within
the NEO community. We should all do our best to explain and use
the
scale to our "customers" - the public and media.
I therefore strongly urge the NEO community as a whole to accept
the
Torino Scale, on the understanding that the time to a
predicted
encounter must be added. This will provide our customers with a
consistent and easy to interpret indication of the current impact
probability, the consequences should such an event occur and the
time
available for mitigative action.
After a year without any better solutions we are out of
time. Before
you jump all over me for changing my mind on this, please
consider the
following questions:
a. Have you got a better suggestion?
b. Can you convince the world's press that yours is a better
idea?
If the answer to either question is "no", the time has
come for the NEO
community to do something almost unique and agree on a matter of
crucial importance. We can either do so now, or continue to
bicker
without agreement for years to come, thereby remaining a divided
and
unconvincing group, lacking the public's confidence.
Jay Tate
Spaceguard UK
=========================
(8) ATTEMPTS TO SILENCE TORINO SCALE CRITICS ARE FUTILE
From Benny J Peiser < b.j.peiser@livjm.ac.uk
>
Jay Tate is concerned about the public image of the NEO
community. He
believes that the public has no confidence in this scientific
group or
its announcements as long as it lacks complete agreement -
particularly
regarding the controversial "Torino Scale." Commenting
on the two last
asteroid scares, Jay reprimands researchers who provided the
media with
"more detailed descriptions than provided by the Scale"
dangerous
information which he considered "to be inconsistent and
consequently
confusing."
This is not the right place to discuss the blunders made in the
public
announcements regarding PHAs 2000 BF19 and 2000 EW70. I do think,
however, that Jay is somewhat naive to expect that researchers
should
only refer the media and science journalists to the Torino Scale
-
refusing any additional comments furthermore.
The Torino Scale may have been intended as a tool for the
scientific
community to "demonstrate a sense of unity with simple,
clear, and
efficient communications." The truth remains, however, that
is has
never gained unambiguous support. In fact, an increasing number
of
researchers have lamented the flaws inherent in the Torino Scale
and
have called for significant changes and revisions. To demand from
these
critics, as Jay does, that they should now "use it with
confidence and
without complaint" is a futile exercise. But to accuse
researchers and
colleagues who do not wish to use the Scale as being
"irresponsible in
the extreme" is, I regret to say, wholly inappropriate and
over the
top.
In contrast to party politics, scientific debate and research
interact
in a system of openess, pluralism and disagreement. This is the
very
essence of scientific progress and development. There is no
reason why
the Torino Scale should be treated like a dogma or party
manifesto.
After all, its recent publication has brought it into the public
domain
for general assessment. Only the future will tell whether or not
it
might be more widely used and accepted as it currently is.
The fact is that everyone is free to use the Torino Scale
according to
their own interpretation. Attempts to stifle scientific criticism
of
its flaws or to gag its critics are not only unjustified but
simply
have no place in the world of scientific debate and research.
Benny J Peiser
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